



ON WHAT IT IS...

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PHILOSOPHY

SCHEDULE AND ABSTRACTS

12–15 FEBRUARY 2015
EÖTVÖS JÓZSEF COLLEGIUM
1118 BUDAPEST, MÉNESI ÚT 11–13.

ON WHAT IT IS... THE PHILOSOPHY OF PHILOSOPHY
CONFERENCE IN METAPHILOSOPHY

CONFERENCE SCHEDULE

12 February THURSDAY

- 10:00 *Welcome & Opening Remarks*
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- 11:20 What is philosophy? (CHAIR: ÁGNES ERDÉLYI)
- 11:20 **Nenad Miscevic** (KEYNOTE SPEAKER): The Continental-Analytic Divide (pp. 11–12)
- 12:20 **Thomas J. Spiegel**: Quietism as a metaphilosophical alternative to Naturalism (pp. 12–14)
- 12:50 **Tuncay Saygin**: Obversely Philosophy contra Philosophy: Nietzsche, Foucault and Deleuze (pp. 14–16)
- 13:20 *lunch break*
- 14:20 **Tamás Hankovszky**: A filozófia és a teológia különeműsége (pp. 16–17)
- 14:50 **Benedek Barna**: A filozófus és a repülőgép (pp. 17–18)
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- 15:30 What makes a work philosophical? (CHAIR: VERONIKA DARIDA)



- 15:30 **Tibor Schwendtner** (KEYNOTE SPEAKER): A filozófiai mű mint értelemalapítás (p. 18)
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- 11:30 **Bence Péter Marosán**: A filozófia módszeréről Hegel és Husserl nyomán (pp. 27–28)
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- 14:00 **Vitor Schwartz:** Rustic skepticism as metaphilosophy (pp. 31–32)
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- 11:40 **Robert Leib:** Political Myth and Its Interruption (pp. 43–45)
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- 16:50 **Elena Popa:** Causal Explanation: Philosophical and Psychological Issues (pp. 55–56)
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- 14:00 **Ádám Tuboly**: A Der logische Aufbau der Welt kontinentális gyökerei (pp. 62–63)
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- 15:10 Philosophy and life (CHAIR: CSABA OLAY)
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- 16:40 **Isik Sarihan:** A Business Proposal to Fight against the Lack of Progress in Philosophy (pp. 66–68)
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- 18:30 **Mária Ludassy** (KEYNOTE SPEAKER): Korszerûtlen elmékedések (p. 71)



ABSTRACTS

12 February THURSDAY

Thu 10:10 Tibor Suttyák: A filozófia mint problémák szerkesztése

Hagyományosan vagy azt szokás a filozófia fő teljesítményének tartani, hogy állításokat tesz a világról, vagy azt, hogy kérdéseket fogalmaz meg. Az első felfogás lehetőséget ad arra, hogy a filozófiát alapvetően folytonosnak tekintsük más vizsgálódási módokkal vagy diszciplínákkal. A második általában a filozófia különeműségét hangsúlyozza, amennyiben azt igyekszik nyomatékosítani, hogy a filozófia dolga, más kutatási területektől eltérően, a kérdések feltevése, nem pedig válaszok megadása. Előadásomban mindkét álláspontot kritikusan kezelem. Megkísérlem megmutatni, hogy a filozófiai „ügy” azonosítása akár állításokkal, akár kérdésekkel egyrészt elvi szinten inadekvát, másrészt nem is írja le azt, ami a filozófiai elméletalkotásban valóban történik. Ehelyett egy harmadik megközelítést javasolok, egy olyat, amely szerint a filozófiai tevékenység lényege problémák megszerkesztése. A problémákban az állítások és a kérdések is meghatározott szerkezeti helyet foglalnak el, de egyik sem dominál. A problémák szerkezetek, amelyek összeállítása kreatív teljesítmény. Az előadásban megkísérlem pontosítani, mit értek „probléma” alatt, és mondandómat egy kiválasztott filozófiai probléma elemzésén keresztül demonstrálom.

Thu 11:20 Nenad Miscevic: The Continental-Analytic Divide

How did the analytic-continental divorce occur? What are the actual trails of historical influence and resemblances that divide the two? The paper distinguishes two groups: the ones not so contrary to analytic ways (the early ones, before the great divorce: Husserl, Dilthey), the “low profile” continentalists, and the typical contrast group (Heidegger, Derrida) the “high profile” continentalists. It concentrates on the later.



Their views are characterized by following distinguishing theses: The anthropological, historical and linguistic is (deeply) ontological. The mind and the world are governed (and constituted) by a-rational elements. The central element of human mind is a-rational, it is either will, desire or affect. And, the basic reality of the world is akin to the a-rational element of human mind. The style of philosophy should exemplify this a-rational side; it should be more poetic than argumentative. /and perhaps, philosophy should be abolished either in politics or in politicized poetic writing.

For the better or worse, most of these theses characterize most of continental tradition functioning nowadays. The contrast with the analytic tradition is dramatic.

Thu 12:20 Thomas J. Spiegel: Quietism as a metaphilosophical alternative to Naturalism

In this talk I aim to answer two questions: 1. What is the relationship between philosophical quietism and scientific naturalism? 2. What is the content of quietism's metaphilosophical proposal? I do this in the following steps: I reconstruct (i) a common conception of scientific naturalism in form of two commitments and an argument, then I introduce (ii) philosophical quietism and its anti-naturalist trajectory. Lastly, I flesh out (iii) quietism's metaphilosophical alternative to naturalism.

(I) Scientific Naturalism

Scientific naturalism (naturalism, henceforth) is best characterised by the following commitments:

Metaphilosophical commitment: Continuity of philosophy and science: Instead of assuming philosophical foundationalism, philosophy should cede areas of inquiry to science whenever necessary and possible. Philosophy's own remaining job is explaining certain phenomena in a way acceptable by scientific theorizing.



Ontological commitment: All that truly exists in the world are those basic entities discovered or posited by the theories of natural sciences (most notably physics). All other phenomena must be in some way related to scientifically respectable entities in a suitable way.

The ontological commitment entails so-called "placement problems" (Huw Price's terminology). For it implies a notion of what is natural, i.e. only those things are natural which are accepted by the (natural) sciences. Primarily, those are spatiotemporal objects: rocks, organisms, chemicals, the earth crust and so on. There are, however, entities which are not a direct objects of the natural sciences, e.g. norms, values, the mind, numbers, modality and so on. This results in placement problems: objects of this sort are difficult to assign a spot in the natural world, if what counts as natural is determined by scientific naturalism. I call phenomena of that kind *hard-to-place phenomena*.

Naturalism's main tool for dealing with placement problems are *metaphysical explanations*. Metaphysical explanations are supposed to assign hard-to-place phenomena a spot in the natural world by *linking* entities respectable by scientific standards with hard-to-place phenomena. The target phenomenon is thereby found to be ontologically somehow dependent on the base phenomenon. The most relevant species of metaphysical explanations are reduction, supervenience, elimination, and emergence

(II) Quietism – answer to question 1

In contrast, philosophical quietism is the view that such philosophical attempts at theoretical explanations about certain concepts and phenomena are misguided or inappropriate. As such, quietism is a metaphilosophical view because it tells us what *not* to do in philosophy. Renowned Quietists are Price, McDowell, Macarthur and the late Rorty. What then is the relation between quietism and naturalism? Quietism rejects two basic assumptions of naturalism: First, Quietism rejects scientific naturalism's view of nature, the idea that only that which is investigated by sciences is part of nature. Consequently, and second, quietism rejects the metaphilosophical task of



integrating hard-to-place phenomena into a naturalistic world-view by way of metaphysical explanation.

(III) Quietism's vision for philosophy – answer to question 2

Quietism has a different metaphilosophical vision of philosophy than scientific naturalism. Where scientific naturalism focuses on providing metaphysical explanations, quietism's role for philosophy aims at, what I call, *pragmatic explanations*. Pragmatic explanations, in the spirit of the pragmatist tradition, are attempts to describe a hard-to-place-phenomenon as an intrinsic feature of a certain discourse or practice to demonstrate that it does not require extra 'placing'. The reason is: if it turns out the hard-to-place phenomena (mind, norms etc.) are actually not hard to place, we do not require metaphysical explanations to reintegrate them into a natural world-view. Once this strategy is in view, we are only required to give local descriptions of such concepts. I close by sketching Huw Price's subject naturalist solution on what those descriptions could consist in.

Thu 12:50 Tuncay Saygin: Obversely Philosophy contra Philosophy: Nietzsche, Foucault and Deleuze

The tradition of the Western Philosophy mainly constructed itself on evolution of the reason. The period of the Western thought from Thales to the Nietzsche looks like an attempt of overcoming of the nature. This attempt directly based on a logical investigation of the truth and therefore philosophy defined "love of knowledge". However, this approach is not acceptable and valid way of philosophizing for all thinkers. Especially Nietzschean approach is totally different from his former. How we can understand Nietzsche's thought and his influence on philosophy, which characterized many followers (e.g. Foucault, Deleuze, Bataille etc.). In this speech, I will argue there is a different way of philosophizing and we can call it obversely philosophy.



In my mind, obversely philosophy is not a part of philosophical tradition that tries to depict to universe with knowledge and understanding of human being by a rational and logical method. It does not define the cosmos and human being inside it in one system. It tries to pluralize or disseminate the truth. Dissemination or pluralization of truth (as Badiou says in the *Wittgenstein's Antiphilosophy* "deposing of the category of truth" (Badiou, 2009: 75)) gives us undeterminable way of the sense but still there is something to say about the life or meaning.

Alain Badiou's definition of the antiphilosophy and his seminars on antiphilosophers (he borrowed this term from Lacan) exactly is a nice way to understanding these thinkers. In his opinion, there are some antiphilosophers, each of them "chooses the philosopher whom he hopes to make a canonical example of the empty and vain shell of a word that for him is philosophy"; "Pascal against Descartes, Rousseau against the Encyclopedists, Kierkegaard against Hegel, Nietzsche against Plato, Lacan against Althusser" (Badiou, 2009: 69).

Beside the Badiou's way of understanding of the antiphilosophers we can argue that antiphilosophers (as Lacan and Badiou called them) also try to reversing of the philosophical tradition. Therefore, there are not just a vis-à-vis positions. Nietzsche is not just against Plato or Platonic idealism; also he is against the Christianity (or Abrahamic religions) and the dialectical and rational ways of philosophy too. On that account, he mainly tries to open a battle front contra to traditional western philosophy, which can understand as a reversing attempt. Nietzschean attack on the philosophy opens another way of the thinking or acting, which is not systematic, not logical, not political, but says something about the *übermensch* (overman), will to power, joy and aesthetical (Nietzsche, 1967; Nietzsche, 2006). Dissemination or pluralization of truth as an obversely attack, like Nietzsche, mainly try to open unique ways of feeling and understanding. I will argue there are some considerable characteristics of the obversely philosophies, which we can see in the Nietzsche's followers like Foucault and Deleuze. Both Foucault and



Deleuze try overcoming of the power relations, which based on truth and logical knowledge. I will discuss their main arguments and terms, (like power and knowledge relation, sexuality, schizoid desire, becoming, and rhizome) as a part of obversely philosophy.

Thu 14:20 Tamás Hankovszky: A filozófia és a teológia különeműsége

A teológusok köreiben népszerű klasszikus felfogás szerint a teológia az isteni kinyilatkoztatás, a filozófia viszont az ész természetes fényében vizsgálja a tárgyait. Ez a tétel azzal a tipikusan filozófiai elképzeléssel kiegészítve, hogy az emberi ész közeli rokonságban áll az istenivel, azt a reményt bátoríthatja, hogy a filozófia és a teológia, ha jól végzik a dolgukat, eredményeiket tekintve összhangban állnak egymással, csak más-más premisszákból jutnak ugyanahhoz a konklúzióhoz. Előadásom alapgondolata, hogy nem ragadjuk meg az iménti metaforikus tétel teljes értelmét, ha úgy értelmezzük, hogy a teológia végső premisszái között olyanok is szerepelnek, amelyeket a kinyilatkoztatás hitelesít, a filozófia axiómái azonban nélkülözik az ilyen megalapozást. Számításba kell venni azt is, hogy Thalész archéja óta a filozófiát az egység keresése jellemzi, míg a teológia gondosan vigyáz arra, hogy az értelmezés és magyarázat közben fel ne számolja a hit antinómiáit: tételek olyan párpait, amelyek ellentmondásos egységet képeznek, de egyaránt igaznak minősülnek. A legfontosabb antinómiák még az ellentmondások kezelésének bevett fogásának is ellenállnak, vagyis hogy kimutassuk, az ellentétes tulajdonságok más-más szempontból illetik meg a vizsgált dolgot. Ezért a teológia túlzott átfilozofizálódásának jele, ha minden ellentmondást felold a hit tételei között. Nem célokom annak vizsgálata, milyen technikákkal kerüli el a sikeres teológia, hogy hűtlen legyen ahhoz a redukálhatatlan sok-szerűséghez, amellyel a kinyilatkoztatásban szembesül, és filozófiai dualizmussá (félúton megrekedt monizmus) vagy dialektikává (körültekintő, árnyalt monizmus) váljon. Előadásom nagyobbik részében inkább néhány tipikus filozófiai jelenség (pl. a takarékosági elv tekintélye, az



iteráció kedveltsége) elemzésével próbálom szemléltetni a tételt, hogy a filozófiai lényege szerint monisztikus: Thalészhoz írt lábjegyzet.

Thu 14:50 Benedek Barna: A filozófus és a repülőgép

A filozófia mára mind a tudományokkal, mind a közvéleménnyel szemben védekező állásba kényszerült. A filozófia szükségessége ellen legtöbbször felhozott érvek, hogy a filozófiából kiváltak a szaktudományok, és a világ megismerésében, megértésében most már ezek segítenek minket; illetve hogy a polgári demokrácia eszméje győzött. Amikor a tudomány átveszi a világmagyarázat feladatát, és a szabadság nem csak politikai utópia, akkor nincs tovább szükség a filozófusra.

Ha figyelmen kívül hagyjuk azt a tényt, hogy a „szükség van-e filozófiára?” maga is filozófiai kérdés, és mint ilyen lényegében megválaszolja saját magát, akkor is könnyen lehet érvelni mindkét kifogással szemben. A tudományok ugyanis maguk is számtalan újabb problémát teremtenek, amelyek kapcsán időről időre újra kell értékelni, amit a világról gondolunk. Az elmúlt két évtized pedig azt mutatta meg világosan, hogy a Szovjetunió bukásakor a történelem végéről fantáziálni korai volt. Egyrészt a felvilágosodás szabad társadalomról alkotott álmoképe láthatóan nem tudott mindenhol győzelmet aratni a világon, másrészt a demokráciáknak is mindig újabb társadalmi-gazdasági problémákkal kell szembenézni.

De továbbra is megmarad az a kérdés, hogy ma milyennek kellene a filozófiának lenni? Ehhez pedig szorosan kapcsolódik egy másik, a filozófia hasznosságáról szóló kérdés is. Ezért van az, hogy ma a filozófusok munkája vagy visszaszorul az egyetemek falai közé, vagy megpróbálkozhatnak az „alkalmazott filozófiával”, azaz a természet- és társadalomtudományok művelőihez hasonló munkamódszerek alkalmazásával. Mindkét esetben egy megadásról van szó: vagy beismerik, hogy a filozófia „haszontalan”, luxus, vagy pedig betagozódnak a mai tudományos életbe.



Kérdés, hogy mindenképpen el kell-e ezt a helyzetet fogadni. Valóban visszakozi kell a filozófusoknak? Lehetséges a filozófiának egy másfajta szerepértelmezése? Erre a kérdésre próbál válaszolni az előadás.

Thu 15:30 Tibor Schwendtner (KEYNOTE SPEAKER): A filozófiai mű mint értelemalapítás

Az előadás arra a kérdésre próbál választ adni, hogy miben áll a filozófiai művek természete. Ha a filozófiát problémák felvetésének és megoldásának tekintenénk, akkor nem tudnánk válaszolni erre a kérdésre, hiszen ebben az esetben nem is lenne értelme filozófiai művekről beszélni, hanem csak rövidebb vagy hosszabb könyvekről, illetve tanulmányokról, melyek ezeket a problémákat és megoldásaikat tartalmazzák. Ahhoz tehát, hogy a filozófiai művek természetét megértsük, más filozófia-fogalomhoz kell fordulnunk. A filozófiát egy lehetetlen feladat megoldási kísérletének tekinthetjük, amely a filozófiában rejlő univerzalitás-igénynek annak ellenére próbál megfelelni, hogy az ember, aki ezt a filozófiát megvalósítja, véges és történeti lény. Az univerzalitás-igényt teljesítő filozófiai vállalkozások törvényszerűen olyan értelem-tereket hoznak létre, melyek töresek tartalmazzák, leginkább Escher rajzaira emlékeztető struktúrákat alkotnak. A filozófiai művek jelentősége abban áll, hogy e lehetetlen vállalkozás paradox struktúráit úgy őrzik meg, hogy az újra és újra megragadhatóvá válik a következő nemzedékek számára.

Thu 16:30 Attila Galambos: Mit kezdünk az állatokkal? Állatokkal kapcsolatos deskripciók a kontinentális filozófiában (és azon túl)

Az állatok (de legalábbis azok bizonyos csoportjai) mindig meghatározó kapcsolatban álltak az emberi társadalmakkal, ehhez képest a filozófia történetében betöltött jelentőségük elenyésző. Példamondatokként,



hasonlatokként számos alkalommal hivatkoznak rájuk, de mint a filozófiai vizsgálódások *tárgya* margóra kerültek. Az állatokkal kapcsolatos kérdésfelvetések, a társadalmi, kulturális, filozófiai összefüggések újragondolása, újraértelmezése azonban a múlt század végén megkezdődött. Előadásomban azokat a jelentősebb álláspontokat vizsgálom, melyek meghatározóak az állatokkal kapcsolatos koncepciók kialakulásában és rögzülésében. Bemutatom továbbá azokat a kérdéseket, melyeket a filozófusok nem tudtak megkerülni téziseik felállítása közben. Végül felvázolom, hogy milyen következtetések útján lehetséges az állatokat a filozófiai vizsgálatok, kérdésfelvetések körébe integrálni, továbbá, hogy milyen eredménnyel jár(hat) mindez a filozófia, mint tudomány kapcsán. Azaz mennyiben változtathatja meg a filozófiát az állatok figyelembevételéle.

Megvizsgálom és kontextusba helyezem azokat a nagy társadalomtörténeti változásokat, melyek egyrészt módosították az állatok emberi társadalmakban betöltött pozícióját (társállatok megjelenése, urbanizáció kapcsán megváltozott viszonyok), másrészt azokat az emberi relációkat, melyek kapcsán az állatokkal való filozófiai aspektusok is változnak (modern farmakológia, túlnépesedés, nagyipari állattartás).

Előadásomban kerülöm az állatfelszabadítással vagy az állati jogokkal kapcsolatos álláspontok bemutatását, elsősorban a filozófiai kánonban megjelenő leírásokat figyelembe véve mutatom be az állatokhoz köthető leírásokat, vizsgálva többek között Nietzsche, Levinas, Heidegger, Deleuze, Singer munkáit, de kitérve például Hume, Descartes, Platón, Kant, Bentham szövegeire is.

Thu 17:10 Adrienne Gálosi: Philosophy without art

Filozófia és művészet mély összefonódását az utóbbi évtizedekben sokan tárgyalták, két különböző álláspontról közelítve: az egyik irány Schellingtől Gadamerig a művészetben olyan közeget lát, amelyben az legsajátabb feladatával, az igazság megragadásával egyedül szembesülhet, miután az a



reflexív megragadás alól minduntalan kivonja magát. A művészet lényegének fogalmi meghatározása itt egyben a filozófia önmegértése is. A másik, leginkább Danto nevéhez köthető elgondolás a művészet filozófia általi kisemmizéséről beszél, s végső soron a művészet történetének végéhez érkezettségét mondja ki. Egy hosszú történet során a filozófia számolta fel, saját fogalmiságával mintegy gyarmatosította azt. A modern művészet története nem más, mint kudarcba fulladt önmeghatározási kísérleteinek sora, míg végül a filozófia sietett segítségére, hogy adjon filozófiai választ. Mindkét esetben a filozófia keretei között és annak hasznára rendeződik a művészet, az egyikben a filozófia előszobája, metafizikai ablak, ahol a nem-fogalmi, közvetlen szemléletességben az igazság „feltáru” (Heidegger), a másikon a filozófia zárja a művészet Bildungsromanját, s teszi ezzel poszt-historikussá a művészetet, hogy aztán ennek helyébe a művészetfilozófia lépjen. Bármennyire különbözőek ezek a közelítések, abban a konklúzióban egyeznek, hogy a művészetnek valamely lényegi meghatározását keresik, s azt valami nem perceptuálisban találják meg. Minden ilyesfajta művészet-filozófia kapcsolat háttérében Hegel filozófiája áll, de míg az első esetben arra esik a hangsúly, hogy művészetben és filozófiában ugyanaz a szellem munkál, addig a másik megközelítés számára a hegeli művészet vége elgondolás lesz paradigmaticussá.

Az előadás azt a kérdést igyekszik röviden körüljárni, hogy mi történik a filozófiával, ha az így vagy úgy támasztékaul szolgáló művészet eltűnik alóla. Az első megközelítést már az nehezé teszi, hogy az „nagy” művekre fókuszál, alapja így egy olyan mű-fogalom, melyet a kortárs műalkotások radikálisan levetnek magukról, felbomlasztják azt a „mű” és a „valóság” közti különböző határvonalak összemosásával. A második megközelítés a kortárs művészet tapasztalatából, vagyis hogy igen sok elmélet szükséges ahhoz, hogy az igen minimalista mű transzponálódjon a művészet síkjára, vonja le – látszólag pesszimista – következtetését, hogy a művészet feloldódott az önmagára vonatkozó reflexióban. Ez látszólag a filozófia korszakát hozza el, azonban a poszt-historikus, poszt-esszenciális mű feloldódik szórt funkcióiban, s így az

azt megragadó filozófia is ilyen szórt, kisszerű „igazságok” ábrázolását detektálhatja csak. Innentől a filozófiának sincs olyan magasabbrendű, autonóm instancája, amelyhez fordulva saját magasrendű célját igazolhatná.

Megmenthetőek-e művészet és filozófia egymás számára? Mit jelent a filozófia számára, ha immár nem a művekről olvassa le, mi a művészet lényege, hanem arra a reflexiós tevékenységre fókuszál, amely az adott érzéki tárgyhoz kapcsolódik, de azt mindig túllépi? Megfogalmazható-e az esztétikai tapasztalat, ha nem egy különös tárgy áll mögötte? És mit jelent a lényeg, az azonosság keresésében, ha elismerjük, hogy ez csak a változó történelmi formák változó értelmű megragadásain keresztül lehetséges?

Thu 17:40 Marta Morozova: About the benefit of convergence between philosophy and poetry (according to philosophical hermeneutics)

Philosophical hermeneutics was created by H.-G. Gadamer. In his writings, he emphasized that philosophy should be useful for people; many researchers have paid attention to the proximity Gadamer's understanding of philosophizing with the conception of «phronesis», «practical knowledge» (Praktisches Wissen). Besides, Gadamer emphasizes the radical difference between scientific way of thinking and humanities, and especially the philosophy, and brings together the statements within the philosophical framework with poetry. But why such convergence is useful?

Firstly, of course, the deal isn't in complete coincidence of philosophical and poetic way of speech. Poetry in representation of language works with the sound, and philosophy - with layer of conceptual meanings. But what they both have in common - is listening to the language.

Obviously, that while creating, a poet perceives the language not only as the flow of information, but right as the linguisticality. He is able to orientate in the sphere of linguistic forms, sometimes creatively changing them.



It should be noticed: Language in philosophical hermeneutics plays a special, fundamental role: because understanding - considering as the basic strategy of human existence in the world - has fundamentally linguistic character. That means: the idea (in specific historical and cultural circumstances) are always fused with its linguistic fixation (Erfassung). And extra-linguistic, sensate experience is included in the language because of symbolizing in it.

The primary task of philosophy is to turn human right to language. In such case, the measure of its success on a par with the art is achievement of involvement, participation (Teilhabe) to person. And also in general philosophy resembles art in terms of how it deals with things: philosophical research, unlike scientific, doesn't aim to work with something (human, cultural phenomena etc.) as an object, but as an our real life's phenomenon, which in turns can't be completely objectified, because always has an event character, i.e. presents as wholeness taking into account our interpretation.

Applied problems of philosophizing is to reveal linguistic (in a broad sense) realities. But the basis of this is appeal to the language in such way so that people understand linguisticity (Sprachlichkeit) as their home, "native land". Such position contains socially, even politically oriented message, because the essence of language, according to Gadamer, is not a speech of one , but always dialogic relationship among people (Gitter des Anderesseins); we learn language from others and - it is always the possibility of mutual understanding, the interaction between some beings. (So, philosophical hermeneutics contains clearly multicultural promise).

Moreover, philosophy should help to understand subject (person) himself, to reveal his own identity. The deal is that intellectual perception of the world, as any other, in fact is always an event. It's important: not the subject by his own forms fully his perception of something, for example, a literary work, but person is involved in its realization like in the conversation. And the proper position of the subject is revealed only in comparison with some another. So, to fully realize himself as a subject, you need to know in relation



to what you are.

Contemporary cultural situation, according to Gadamer, suffers from break with the previous tradition, from its negation sometimes, and also from that a lot of concepts, stereotypes are still used without awareness of the source of its usefulness, necessity. And all this - heritage, contradictions, tendencies of modernity - embodied in language, but often adopted uncritically because of the fact perceiving it in the level of momentary information. Such oblivion of language can be likened to exile from the native land, because our homeland is language itself. The actual task of philosophizing becomes then to revive in subject (person) sense of participation to the language, and help to understand its realities.

The convergence between philosophy and art in general and particularly with poetry let to emphasize that philosophical researches are founded in the sphere of free realization of human possibilities (equally in cases of creation, evaluation etc.). Participation in the experience of philosophizing develops independence and liveliness of thought, which are so necessary for people now, when it's so simple to live just following standards. Philosophy cultivates critical courage, helps to create a creative space in which it's possible to expand the horizons of our habitual perception.

So, useful character of philosophy means that as a cognitive tool philosophical study converges with art. Using philosophical studies people can transform their own experience, which always has a real life value. So, there's a convergence between poetry and philosophy because they both represents a way of participation subject/person to himself, and so - to the proper whole experience of the world.

Thu 18:10 László Kajtár: Philosophical Literature and Literary Philosophy

The debate is still going strong about whether literary works have cognitive value, and even if most agree that they do, it is contested whether this value



is related to their aesthetic values. In a different form, the debate is as ancient as a divergence in views between Plato and Aristotle. As Peter Lamarque interprets it, Plato condemned poets partly because they imitate the world of appearance, while Aristotle praised them because they imitate universal truths about human character and action. Both of them considered truth to be a measure of the value of poetry, and so philosophy has acquired the right to judge the value of an art form. Due to this, the question whether literary quality could be a measure of philosophy took the backseat.

Aristotle said that poetry, that is imaginative literature, is more philosophic than history. I want to argue here that literature is often more philosophic than philosophy itself. The step in this direction that I want to take is the following. It does matter how knowledge is communicated. The paradigmatic contemporary form of philosophy is argumentative, that is, the claims to truth are supported and structured by argumentation. In contrast, to follow John Gibson, literary works articulate a cultural understanding of the world in dramatic form.

Lamarque emphasizes the contrast between philosophy and literature by referring to them as different social and cultural practices, different institutions. However, the line is not clear cut. As Jukka Mikkonen argues, it is hard to see an exact demarcation between literary philosophy and philosophical literature. It seems really difficult if not impossible to make a principled distinction between Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and Dostoyevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov* in this respect. On the face of it, there is a crucial difference, namely that readers of philosophy show little tolerance for works that they deem to be wrong. On the contrary, as Lamarque claims, readers of literature are tolerant towards the works that suggest alternative visions to their own. Being right seems to trump everything else in philosophy, but the question is, based on philosophical literature, should it?



The reason I am claiming, paraphrasing Aristotle, that literature can be more philosophic than philosophy itself is because I think it is a mistake to conceive of philosophy as merely making truth claims in argumentative form. I want to argue here that it is an important facet of philosophy that it makes its audience think or provokes thought about important issues of human concern. While this is not a process that necessarily results in some positive statements at the end, it is a process that is or should be seen as cognitively beneficial. In this respect, if a work of literature is more likely to make readers think, more likely to provoke thought, it is more philosophic in a sense than a piece that is standardly philosophical. I do not mean to say that argumentation is always at a loss here or that this process trumps truth stating and clever support, but I certainly think that taking a page from the book of literary rhetoric can be of advantage. Especially if one is inclined to agree that the best argument stated in the clearest way is not always the most thought provoking. Now I am not claiming that provoking thought is unique to philosophy or that it is the only value of philosophy, I am arguing that it is an important and often neglected marker of what we call philosophical. It is also a marker that is highlighted by our continued fascination and deep engagement with works of literature that we see as exploring our deepest concerns with ourselves and the world.

13 February FRIDAY

Fri 10:00 János Tózsér: A filozófiai problémák természete

Minden filozófusnak az életében legalább egyszer fel kell tennie a kérdést: „kitarthatok-e a filozófiai nézeteim mellett, ha belátom, hogy más filozófusok, akiket magammal episztemikusan egyenrangúnak ismerek el, nem fogadják el a filozófiai nézeteimet? Hihetek-e az általam képviselt filozófiai elméletben, ha belátom, hogy az csak egy a sok közül, melyek mindegyikét olyan filozófusok képviselik, akik ugyanazzal az evidenciabázissal és nagyjából ugyanolyan érvelési képességekkel rendelkeznek, mint én?”



Mivel a feltett kérdés eldöntendő, leszámítva azt a választ, hogy „nem tudom” és hogy „a kérdés értelmetlen”, kétféleképpen válaszolhatsz. Vagy azt mondhatod, hogy e belátásod aláássa a filozófiai vélekedéseidet, vagy azt, hogy nem ássa alá. Az első esetben fel kell függesztened a filozófiai vélekedéseidet, vagy legalábbis át kell értékelned azok episztemikus státusáról gondoltakat. A második esetben minden maradhat a régiben: mindennapi filozófiai tevékenységedet folytathatod úgy, mintha mi sem történt volna. Komoly tétje van hát annak, hogyan válaszolsz.

Előadásomban a szkeptikus megfontolás mellett fogok érvelni; amellett, hogy fel kell függeszteni a filozófiai ítéleteinket. Előadásom első részében a szkeptikus és nem-szkeptikus oldal vitáját elemzem. Második részben egy meghatározott filozófiai problémát vizsgálok. A harmadik részben e probléma kapcsán megmutatom, hogy valójában mi a nyugtalanító az episztemikusan egyenrangú filozófusok nézetkülönbségében. A negyedik részben a filozófiai problémák általános természetéről adott víziómat adom elő. Az ötödik részben pedig szkeptikus (kissé szomorú) következtetéseimet sorolom fel.

Fri 11:00 Gábor Forgács – Ákos Gyarmathy: A filozófiai következtetések metadiszkurzív megalapozásáról

A filozófiai irodalomban egyre gyakoribb tendencia, hogy a vitázó felek, miután nem tudnak megegyezni egy-egy álláspontjukat alátámasztó érv státuszáról, meta-szinten folytatják a vitát. Ezekben a vitákban gyakran hivatkozunk érvényesnek tekintett következtetésekre, illetve azokra az elemi következtetési sémákra, melyek helyes alkalmazása ezek érvényességéért felel. Bármely következtetési szabállyal kapcsolatban felmerülhet a kérdés: vajon miért fogadjuk el érvényesnek? Gyakori stratégia a következtetési szabályok helyes alkalmazásának megvitatása. Krabbe (2003) azonban rámutatott arra, hogy a viták meta-szintű megalapozása esetén nem tudjuk elkerülni a végtelen regresszust vagy a körbenforgást.



A dedukcióval szemben szkeptikus vitapartner például eliheti nekünk, hogy a „ha p akkor q” és “p” állítások igazak, abban azonban továbbra is kételkedhet, hogy mindebből következik “q” igazsága. A kérdés különös jelentőséggel merül fel azokban az esetekben, melyekben a vitázó álláspontok egyikének védhetősége azon múlik, hogy a vita során felmerülő bármely érvben alkalmazott következtetési séma érvényes -e. Lewis Carrol (1895) modus ponens ellen intézett közismert kritikája is rámutat e következtetési séma megalapozásának nehézségére. A vita során Achilleusz egy modus ponens következtetést próbál elfogadtatni a teknőssel, aki a következtetési szabály elfogadásával elvesztené a vitát.

Vajon a teknős a modus ponens, mint metaszabály, elutasításával implikálja-e másik metaszabály bevezetését? Paul Boghossian (2012) amellett érvel, hogy az inferencia fogalmát nem lehet doxasztikusan, intuícióra vagy kontrafaktuálisokra alapozni, ehelyett a következtetések vak szabálykövetésen alapulnak. Broome (2012) ezzel szemben a következtetések diszpozicionális értelmezése mellett érvel, míg Wright (2012) szerint a következtetések pusztán az “indokok szerinti cselekvés” aletei, tehát az előbbi megértéséhez az utóbbi megértése szükséges.

Előadásunkban Boghossian, Broome és Wright a következtetések megalapozásának problémájával kapcsolatos vitáját elemezzük.

Fri 11:30 Bence Péter Marosán: A filozófia módszeréről Hegel és Husserl nyomán

Abból a helyzetből, hogy a filozófiában mind a mai napig egymásnak ellentmondó, de egyformán koherens, racionálisan, logikailag egyformán felépített és megformált álláspontok vannak a legkülönbözőbb alapkérdésekben, sokak számára kézenfekvőnek tűnt az a következtetés, hogy a filozófia alapkérdéseire ismeretszerűen nem lehet választ kapni; olyan módon tehát, hogy az egyik vagy másik álláspontot konszenzuálisan tényként, tehát az adott kérdés megoldásaként lehessen elismerni. A jelen előadásban



amellett szeretnék majd érvelni, hogy a filozófia művelésének van ismeretszerű relevanciája; tehát 1) a filozófia alapkérdései igenis eldönthetőek, 2) a filozófia művelése által ismereteket szerzünk, tehát olyasmit tudunk meg önmagunkról és a világról, amit azelőtt nem tudtunk. Az előadás gondolatmenetében két szerzőre fogok támaszkodni elsősorban: Hegel és Husserl munkásságára.

Hegelnél az volt az alapvető meggyőződése, hogy ahol két, egymást logikailag kizáró, de egyforma bizonyító erejű állásponttal találkozunk, ott csak az a magasabb szempont vagy kontextus hiányzik, amely felől nézve nyilvánvalóvá válik a két álláspont szükségszerű össze-tartozása. *Egyfajta filozófiai optikára van szükségünk, mely egyesíti az ellentéteket.* Hegelnél ez a végső kontextus, a legmagasabb szempont, az abszolút szellem nézőpontja volt. Hasonló megfontolásokkal élt a filozófiatörténettel kapcsolatos vizsgálódásai során Husserl is. Nála a végső kontextust a történeti módon létesülő transzcendentális interszubjektivitás jelentette.

Ahhoz, hogy a kontextualizálásnak ezt a módszerét egyáltalán el tudjuk kezdeni, élnünk kell néhány nagyon erős filozófiai előfeltevéssel: 1) mindannyian ugyanabban a világban élünk, 2) nyelvünk szavai végső soron ugyanazokra a dolgokra referálnak. Ha ezeket az előfeltevéseket érvényesíteni tudjuk, akkor viszont a kontextualizálás plauzibilis módszerként kínálkozik arra, hogy kezelni tudjuk általa a hagyományos filozófiai alapproblémákat.

Fri 12:00 Henrik Farkas: Perspektivizmus és totalizáció

Az előadás a filozófiai perspektíva jelentőségét és a filozófiai perspektivizmus lehetőségeit és korlátait kívánja megvilágítani. Perspektíva alatt a gondolkodásnak azt a lokális pozícióját értjük, ahonnan nem érthető jelenségek igazolt, azaz tapasztalatilag és/vagy logikailag megalapozott érthetőségre tesznek szert, perspektivizmus alatt pedig arra a felfogásra



utalunk, amely szerint a gondolkodás egy adott jelenséghez több, nem ritkán egymást kizáró pozícióból is képes igazolt értelmet társítani.

Első lépésben ismertetjük a perspektivizmus történeti alakzatait, és megpróbáljuk röviden jellemezni azokat. Itt legalább három fő megjelenési formáját különíthetjük el: a konstruktivizmust (annak legkülönbözőbb változataiban), a pragmatizmust és a hermeneutikát. E vizsgálódásra elsősorban azért van szükség, hogy a perspektivizmus általunk használt fogalmát ne azonosítsuk automatikusan a relativizmussal (az előbbi számon kéri a pozíciók érthetőségi kritériumait, és képes kommunikálni a többi perspektívával, például azok érthetőségi kritériumairól).

Második lépésben a perspektivizmus sokat emlegetett vakfoltjára mutatunk rá, azaz arra, hogy ha egymással episztemikusan egyenrangú, de adott esetben egymást kizáró pozíciók bármelyike érvényes (pl. a szabadság mellett és ellen érvelők, a tudat mellett és ellen érvelők, a moralitás relevanciája mellett és ellen érvelők stb. álláspontjai), akkor fel kell adni az abszolút pozíció, vagyis végső soron az igazság eszméjét (nem tudhatjuk meg, van-e szabadság, tudat, megalapozható-e a morál stb.).

Ez vezet át ahhoz az általánosabb metafilozófiai kérdéshez, hogy a perspektivizmus és az abszolút pozíció (a gondolkodás totalizáló karaktere) egymást kizáró tendenciája mennyire szükségszerű része a filozófiai gondolkodás szerkezetének. Vagy másképpen: lehetséges-e a filozófiai gondolkodás e kettő egyidejű jelenléte nélkül.

Lezárásként azt nézzük meg, hogy ha feltételezzük e kettő szükségszerű jelenlétét, milyen megoldások bukkanhatnak fel ezek kibékítésére. Ennek érzékeltetésére a hegeli modellt vesszük alapul, ahol a szerző egyszerre vet számot a filozófiai gondolkodás látszólag egymást kizáró perspektíváival (a tudat különféle alakzataival), és próbál közöttük egyúttal olyan rendalakzatot is kialakítani (a dialektika segítségével), amely, megtartva e perspektívák relatív érvényességét, magának a filozófiai gondolkodásnak az abszolút pozícióját is kijelöli.



Fri 13:30 Tamás Paár: Meta-Skepticism, Experimentalism, Cartography: the Dead-Ends of Philosophy

My paper consists of two parts. In the first half I try to show how the concepts featured in the title hang together. By meta-skepticism I mean meta-philosophical skepticism, the view that is skeptical about every philosophical theory. I dub the the radical stream of experimental philosophy experimentalism: according to this project, the presently abundant reference to intuitions in philosophy is a flawed practice, it is to be eliminated. I characterize as cartography the meta-philosophical view that sees the appropriate aim of philosophy in working out a map of consistently acceptable positions. It is also a part of this view that after we have finished drawing this map, one's philosophy depends only on mere intuitions understood as opinions or beliefs. The thesis to be defended in the first part of my paper is that experimentalism and cartography lead to meta-skepticism.

Meta-skeptics often build on the principle according to which one should suspend judgment in case of peer disagreement. The most serious challenge for any form of meta-skepticism is that its supporting arguments call this very principle into question. Bryan Frances gives the most plausible answer to this challenge. Frances evades it by going so far as to suspend judgment about whether disagreeing epistemic peers should or should not suspend judgment. Frances does this because of another principle and holds that even if we suspend judgment on the main motivation of this kind of skepticism, we might remain meta-skeptics anyway. In the second half of my presentation I argue that even Frances's solution to the problem is wanting.

If the arguments presented in the second part succeed and my strategy can be generalized to every forms of meta-skepticism that implies the untenable nature of meta-philosophical skepticism. Given that the connection shown in the first half of the paper holds, this implies the refutation of



experimentalism and the mistake of the cartographer's approach to philosophy.

Fri 14:00 Vitor Schwartz: Rustic skepticism as metaphilosophy

Ancient skepticism, unlike its modern counterpart, is an essentially metaphilosophical stance. It is not by chance that the main work of Sextus Empiricus, the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, begins with an assessment of the three types of philosophy: skeptical, academic, and dogmatic. This sort of overview of philosophy in general was a natural concern for ancient Pyrrhonists, since they were proponents of a suspension of judgment about everything (*epoche peri panthon*), thus regarding themselves as adhering to a philosophical stance superior to all others.

The aim of this paper is first to defend a contemporary version of skepticism, inspired by a rustic interpretation of the works of Sextus Empiricus, and second, to address a major objection to neo-Pyrrhonism: the charge that it too is a metaphilosophy, subject to debate like any other metaphilosophy. By this critical view, to be a skeptic would be to choose dogmatically between rival metaphilosophies, making skepticism in itself incoherent.

In the first part of the paper, I argue that in light of the expressed suspension of judgment that we see in Sextus – insofar as the opinions of the plain man – and also in light of the skeptic path toward *epoche*, the rustic interpretation of the philosopher's work is more convincing than the rival urbane interpretation. Moreover, a coherent rustic skepticism can be defended – that is, a philosophical position of someone who claims to have no beliefs whatsoever (in contrast to a more mitigated 'urbane' skepticism directed only against complex beliefs).

I propose an analogy: A fictitious Eleatic philosopher who, convinced by his reading of Parmenides, "knows" that all those statements we make about things in our ordinary life are false wouldn't face accusations of incoherence



as much as the skeptic. Such a hypothetical Eleatic philosopher leads a life within a world he “knows” to be an illusion: he believes in the falseness of most of the propositions he uses in his ordinary life. I ask, therefore, why it is that we encounter more resistance against the humbler philosophy of a Pyrrhonist who, having seriously considered many different philosophies and found equipollence, and consequently *epoche*, says he follows to *phainomenon* (the apparent) without believing or hypostasizing them. Very few critics accuse the Eleatic philosopher - who “knows” at every second that the world is totally different from the way in which it appears – of incoherence; yet, many criticize the skeptic, who only thinks that the world *might* be different from the way in which it appears. It is not easy to explain the discomfort caused by skepticism in its interlocutors. Maybe we should concur with Sextus, who wrote in M VII 27: “(...) man is by nature a truth-loving animal.” Skeptics are still confronted with the age-old *apraxia* charge: “If you are in doubt whether what you see around you is real or not, how can you act?” But it is unclear why a similar question is not asked of many other philosophers; for example: “If you know that what you see around you are not things in themselves, but only appearances, why do you act on them?”

Still, a coherent rustic neo-Pyrrhonism faces an even fiercer objection than the traditional *apraxia* charge: One of the features of skepticism (both rustic and urbane) which makes it such an interesting metaphilosophy is the first of the five modes of Agrippa leading to suspension of judgment – disagreement (*diaphonia*). According to this mode, we find such a variety of opinions about every subject that may arise that we are forced to suspend judgment about everything, and hence to be skeptics. In the second part of the paper, I explain why I think skepticism itself is not part of a variety of philosophical stances in conflict and therefore is not subject to the mode of *diaphonia*. The skeptic way is a very peculiar metaphilosophy.



Fri 14:30 Snjezana Corak: Analytical and Continental Philosophy: Is There a Possibility of a Merger?

When we talk about the nature of philosophy, that is, when we are engaged in metaphilosophy, we become faced with a variety of different questions. These questions usually refer to the aim, method, nature and value of philosophy and are answered differently from mutually distinct philosophical perspectives. The most common differentiation in contemporary philosophy is the one between analytical and continental philosophy. If we look closely at these two traditions we find that they indeed have different motives, goals and tools which help them in addressing philosophical problems. The question that presents itself here is: can those two philosophical traditions be combined or is it an impossible task?

In order to answer this question, I will try to point out the major differences between the analytical and continental traditions. My exposition of the history of the dispute between the two traditions touches briefly on the period between Kant and Hegel, and presents itself more clearly on the examples of analytical philosophers B. Russell, L. Wittgenstein and R. Carnap, as well as on the continental philosopher E. Husserl (with a mere mentioning of the existentialists). Although methodology highlights the rupture between the traditions (which can roughly be summarised as analysis versus synthesis), is it possible to combine the different approaches in solving philosophical questions? If we perceive analytical philosophy as a tradition that is more closely connected to science, we see how it could have aspired to eliminate metaphysics and thrive to become rigorous science. This will be best shown on the analytical movement known as logical positivism. Logical positivism, from Carnap's point of view, should reject all metaphysical questions and the language of science should be the only criterion of truth. The early Wittgenstein also stands on the side of science and concludes that philosophy is a critique of language that should eliminate metaphysical talk. This positivist point of view calls to facts.



On the opposite side, phenomenology calls back to experience i.e. back to things themselves. Husserl was the founder of the phenomenology concept. In agreement with positivism, he shares the idea that experience is the sole source of knowledge, but also thinks that experience extends beyond what empiricism makes of it. So, instead of only analysing facts, Husserl wants to discover and analyse the essence of things. A more revised look on Husserl's transcendental phenomenology was given by existential phenomenologists such as Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, but here we are not going to discuss them too extensively.

If we go back to defining analytical and continental philosophies, we come to the conclusion that analytical philosophy concerns itself with the analysis of thought, language, logic, knowledge etc., whereas continental philosophy focuses on the humanistic traditions of, say, literature and art. At this point it is very important to state that all the mentioned philosophers and traditions are not to be generalised. Although they are clearly divergent in some issues and have different places in philosophy, we mustn't exclude the possibility that they can contribute to one another. Philosophy is a historical movement which deals with social and political questions as well as more technical problems of logic and epistemology. It would be best if we didn't assume that analytical or continental philosophy stand above each other, rather side by side. All questions, regardless of their tendency toward science or metaphysics, should be put under the scope of philosophical questions.

Fri 15:10 László Nemes: Who Is the Philosopher Anyway?

There exists a conception of philosophy according to which the personal aspects of the philosopher do not really matter, philosophical investigations are rather confined to pure concepts, arguments and ideas. Recently two challenges were made against this approach: first, experimental philosophy studying philosophical intuitions in particular situations; and second, the idea of philosophy as a way of life promoted by Pierre Hadot. Both assume that



philosophy is not just about abstract ideas, so the human factor should play a crucial role in it. In my lecture I combine these two approaches by emphasizing that intuitions are not created in a detached way, but are parts of the whole context of the philosopher's life and culture. Therefore it could be of interest to study the philosophers' way of life in a systematic way similar to experimental philosophy. I survey what we can know about the cultural and social background, worldview and way of life of leading members of the current community of philosophers. I suggest that experimental philosophy should broaden its horizon and study wider connections to gain new insights about the nature of philosophy and certain characteristics of the philosopher community. Further, I claim that to be really experimental, experimental philosophy must be open to experiments on various ways of life.

Fri 16:10 Josef Ehrenmüller: On the psychodynamics of Doing Philosophy

As a psychoanalyst I have run psychoanalytically oriented self experience groups with students of philosophy in the department of Philosophy in Vienna. In this paper I will present some of the results that I have gathered. The main focus in these groups has been why and how these students became interested in philosophy. For most of them problems and difficult circumstances in life are the starting point. Many have to deal with experiences of being an outsider, feelings of otherness and retreat and solitude for at least a period of time. That is to say they suffer a lack of recognition in various ways, which leads to a characteristic psychodynamic development involving a mutual devaluation that I will outline. Furthermore, this lack of recognition and this psychodynamics can be seen in some of the motives and themes throughout the history of Western philosophy, which I will demonstrate with the examples of the Thales anecdote and the allegory of the cave. In addition, I will seek to establish why recognition remains a precarious issue for people doing philosophy, or more generally, engaging in a discipline where worldviews are at stake and clash. The main reason for this



is, among others, that doing philosophy is not only trying to argue in a rational way; it is essentially a gut issue too.

Fri 16:50 Necdet Yildiz: On Socrates' Understanding of Philosophos in Plato's Apologia: A Contemporary Perspective

The name of Socrates represents a set of values for each philosopher and each student of philosophy, although the “what” of these values change from age to age, from society to society, and even from person to person. This is firstly because of the fact that the interpretations of texts are relative to the readers' intents and assumptions hidden or bare. Even the writers of our age can be interpreted in various ways. When it comes to Socrates, given the fact that he wrote nothing, and his enormous effects on his contemporaries and future readers, the case is more and more complicated. Naturally enough, there is hardly an agreement on the issue of Socrates' reception. While some adore “a Socrates of their own”, others disgrace him with the evidences they have and interpret. I think in parallel to many scholars claiming that it is impossible to claim the knowledge of “historical Socrates” hundred percent correct. However, since we can see his immense effect on the value systems of the societies in the history and even of today's society, he is more than worthy to study, especially if one would like to have an insight on the issue “what it is to be a philosopher”. His demeanor, at least according to the testimony of Plato, may even be counted as *the* philosophical demeanor. Indeed, it had been read so from many ages and is still read such by many, and he is considered by many to be not only the founder of philosophy, but the philosophical father of today's western civilization.

In this paper, I will try to expose and comment on Socrates' understanding of *philosophos* in Plato's *Apologia*. Doing this, I will firstly discuss Socrates' understanding of *philosophos*, vis-à-vis *sophistes* and *sophos*. Then I will state that Socrates sees philosophy as a way of life, and will try to catch his understanding of “a life worth living” and his attitude towards life and “the



most important things”. Then, I will try briefly to expose “the why” of philosophy for Socrates. Finally, I will ask a question which is “can sophistry and philosophy be distinguished clearly?”, and will attempt to answer it briefly. Lastly, with inspirations from some contemporary quotations, I will try to adapt Socratic understanding to today, and will give a Socratic account on “what it is to be a philosopher” today.

Fri 17:20 Viktor Ivankovic: Steering Clear of Bullshit: Philosophy and the Principle of Clarity

Harry Frankfurt’s widely acknowledged and prized essay *On Bullshit* stirred up plenty of controversy in the philosophical world. Frankfurt’s bullshitter, a person unconcerned with truth and essentially a faker and bluffer dealing in trifles, is certainly one epistemic attitude philosophers should concern themselves with, but, as Jerry Cohen rightly points out, Frankfurt’s scrutiny is too narrow to grasp other kinds of bullshit that we might find relevant. My presentation deals with such instances in the very field we research and profess.

In our lives as philosophers, we have certainly been, at more points than one, equated with bullshitters, with traders of hot air and nonsense, and individuals who needlessly cast straightforward and simple things in murky waters. The association of philosophy as bullshit peddling goes so far in certain cultures that, at least colloquially speaking, ‘philosophizing’ denotes the exact same thing as bullshitting. The philosopher’s attempt to prove otherwise to the non-philosopher responds to a *social demand for justification*. This justification, however, occupies only one part of the philosopher’s busy schedule, as he also needs to justify himself, and prove that he is steering clear of bullshit, to other philosophers – the *philosophical demand for justification*.

While both problems attract attention, I will here pay more attention to the second one, and assume philosophers have earned some minimal level of



justification from their non-philosopher accusers. I will argue that the problem of bullshit in philosophy is not only existent, but a troubling one, and that it requires a methodological principle which would address it. Jerry Cohen's main interest is on the kind of philosophical nonsense, or bullshit, which is not only unclear and obscure, but cannot be rendered unobscure, or is such that if we are able to break the obscurity down, the resulting product is trivial or unrecognizable compared to the original thing that was said. The historical context of Cohen's problem primarily lies in the distinction between continental and analytical philosophers, where the latter, adhering to methodological principles of clarity, simple language and clear-cut definitions, object to the former's illustrious expression, alleged ambiguities, and hazy terminology. My substantiated position here will be that there certainly are grounds for some such claims and some of their particular applications, but also that the domain of bullshitters might easily run across boundaries of philosophical tradition.

The problem of philosophical bullshit is closely connected to that of so-called obscurantism. An obscurantist, I will claim, is a philosopher who does one (or several) of the following things: 1.) intentionally obscures his claims for pose and pomposity (which may bring about an air of wisdom around the obscurantist); 2.) obscures his claims because they are trivial; 3.) obscures his claims to cover up weaknesses and inconsistencies; 4.) fails to acknowledge a demand for clarification. The fourth is especially important with regard to my claim that neologisms and hazy terminology are not problems independently speaking, but only if their application is jump started at the expense of the principle of clarity and conceptual rigor.

The order of the sections will go as follows. First, I will show why the conception of bullshit that Frankfurt deals with is not sufficiently wide, and examine whether Cohen's conception of bullshit is completely adequate. Second, I look into whether bullshit and obscurantism are neatly overlapping concepts, at least with regard to philosophical bullshit that we are here discussing. Third, I will try to define the features and variations of



philosophical bullshit/obscurantism, and assess their prevalence in the stated philosophical traditions. Fourthly, I deal with three objections to my argument against bullshit/obscurantism: 1.) *the relativist objection* - that obscurities are in the eye of the beholder, and hence, that obscurantism cannot be pinned down; 2.) *the composition objection* – that philosophy, dealing with complex and obscure problems, demands complex and obscure conceptual frameworks; and 3.) *the elitist objection* – that philosophical obscurities are an integral part of the philosopher’s stylistic license. Finally, I discuss a negative definition of the principle of clarity as “steering clear of bullshit”, and discuss problems for such an account.

Fri 17:50 Kristina Kersa: The problem of unity in Kant’s conception of philosophy

With this paper I attempt to fill the gap in contemporary Kant scholarship, which pays little or no attention to Kant’s overall conception of philosophy as a distinct kind of activity. In this way the fascinating question about the nature of philosophical activity and the elucidation of philosophical method at large are overlooked. I take it to be an important inquiry that stands apart from the disputes about the nature of Kant’s metaphysics. While a metaphilosophical stance and metaphysical assumptions are certainly related, it is useful, first, to pay attention to Kant’s conception of philosophy in general; that is, to his struggle to define the unity of the theoretical-practical endeavor that the practice of philosophy is for him. Doing so will allow us to gain insight into the complex cluster of concepts related to the notion of freedom that define the human subject, and to understand the insolvable question of the unity of theoretical and practical reason under a single principle in a system of thought.

I start by introducing the problem of the unity of reason as it is variously formulated in Kant’s critical writings, and argue that ultimately the problem of the unity should be understood as the problem of the unified system of



philosophy unfolding from a single a priori principle. I look at the notes in Opus Postumum entitled “What is Transcendental Philosophy?” where Kant challenges once again the idea of the human subject under a single a priori synthetic principle that unifies transcendental philosophy. To make sense of Kant’s remarks in the Opus, I examine first the cluster of freedom related concepts grounding his conception of the self in critical writings; and secondly, Kant’s thoughts on metaphilosophy in critical period. I argue that metaphilosophical presuppositions about the nature of philosophical activity bring us closer to understanding the final unity of human subject.

I conclude that we should take Kant’s late theory of ideas in the Opus as separating the problem of the unity of reason from its earlier metaphysical manifestations (i.e., the unity through the concept of purposiveness of nature in the third Critique and the unity through the postulates of pure practical reason in moral theology). My claim is that Kant takes here a step back from metaphysics and considers the unity of reason on a normative level of transcendental ideas, which are now construed in a new way representing the foundational core of both theoretical and practical philosophy. This frees him from the impossible task of providing for the metaphysics of the radically unknowable subject based on the disjunct cluster of freedom-concepts; the solution itself, however, is purely idealist. The nature of the transcendental idealism based on methodological necessity needs to be clarified further: the a priori synthetic principle of the unity of transcendental philosophy is said to be transcendental philosophy itself. I argue that without this final move, which renders the grounding of transcendental practical arguments in methodological necessity (existing, as it were, in the mind of a philosophy only), we merely have at our disposal the broadly anthropological grounding of the ultimate subject of transcendental philosophy. What Kant does in the last pages of the Opus is to shift the question of the unified human subject into the metaphilosophical domain, where it is not a kind of anthropological ‘normative essentialism’ but a strong statement on the nature of

philosophical activity and its demands on the person of a philosopher that becomes significant.

14 February SATURDAY

Sat 10:00 Zsolt Bagi: Political Community and its Philosophy

Politics and Philosophy: a precautionous title for a discussion and the caution is indeed justified. Not political philosophy nor philosophy of politics not even politics of philosophy but politics *and* philosophy. It suggests that the relation and the hierarchy between the terms should not be decided prior to the discussion.

Yet no matter how many precautions we take, talking about philosophy and politics always involves theoretical decisions prior to discussion. “What politics are?”, “what philosophy is?” these are questions unanswerable by a simple definition; they require theoretical (and indeed practical) commitment. In this lecture I would like to take as little commitment as possible (that is: claim on the nature of politics and philosophy as little as possible) to answer a philosophical question what makes a community to be political and – perhaps more importantly – what undoes a community called political. It is clear that I have shifted the discussion regarding the relations of philosophy and politics to the question of a philosophy *of* the political *community*. This is a serious commitment in itself, but in my mind an unavoidable one. Without seriously taking into account the question of the community that lies behind politics it is vain to hope a general answer to the question what politics are or what they should be, not to mention their relations to any human activity, particularly to philosophy. It is of no surprise that neither the ancient nor the modern political philosophy neglected this question, in fact they placed in the center of their philosophical investigations. The problem of the *politeia* and the problem of the social



contract are the points of collisions where philosophy ran into the question of politics.

Politics according to Plato and Aristotle just as to Max Weber pertain to a special kind of community. A community defined by economical relations does not suffice to speak about politics, a political community surpasses the economical community. Moreover a political community is not a racial community, as Aristotle have asserted, it presupposes a distinction between race (man and women) and rulership or more generally power (master and slave). What needs to be analyzed is the question what this “surpassing” means. There is no community without integration. But what does it mean this kind of integration “surpasses” economical integration on one side and racial integration on the other? And the question interlinked with this one: how can political community avoid this triple menace, disintegration, economization and ethnicization?

Sat 11:00 Zlata Bozac: Private equality and public rights: Could egalitarian ethos be an appropriate political principle?

Jerry Cohen famously criticized Rawls's theory of justice for being narrowly applied only to institutions of the society (its basic structure) and for making a false distinction between the requirements of justice for institutions and the requirements of justice for individuals. According to Cohen, the pursuit of justice cannot be divorced from the individual behaviour of the citizens. In order to achieve a truly just society, egalitarian ethos has to be a guiding principle for both individual behaviour and institutional structure. Egalitarian ethos however, can be bounded by the personal prerogative of each individual to live his/her own life and pursue his/her interests to a reasonable extent. However, as I will argue in this paper, Cohen cannot reconcile the demands of an egalitarian ethos and the personal prerogative, without making one of them (presumably latter) meaningless. Although he claims to acknowledge the importance of personal prerogative and consequently, the



fact of value pluralism seriously, he is unable to consistently incorporate it in his own theory. I argue that in his envisioned society there would be no place for the meaningful pursuit of personal goals and conceptions of the good life, since people would have to, in order to pursue egalitarian ethos, seriously limit their needs and scope of their personal prerogative. Although justice is the first virtue of social institutions, we also have to somehow acknowledge the fact that it is not the first virtue or goal in many individual conceptions of the good life. While Cohen's theory of justice merely acknowledges the existence of moral reasons that can override the primacy of claims of egalitarian justice, Rawls's conception truly incorporates those reasons and the fact of value pluralism as a default feature of human societies which has to be not merely tolerated, but appropriately acknowledged and sustained as something intrinsically valuable. Although individual pursuit of justice must correspond, at least to some extent, to public principles of justice, Cohen's egalitarian ethos fails to provide us with guidance about its appropriate extent, at least not without sacrificing all other things that we consider important in our lives. Considering all this, I argue that Cohen's egalitarian ethos is not an appropriate principle for organizing our political life. Furthermore, I will consider some further issues that might arise from these conclusions. Can we, as political philosophers, change the world? What are the reasonable demands that political philosophy can impose on people? To what extent should our thinking be bound by reasonable pluralism and basic human right (and need) to follow personal conception of the good life? Could highly ideal theories, such as Cohen's, provide us with guidance for political action? Should we, as political philosophers, limit our prescriptions to institutional design?

Sat 11:40 Robert Leib: Political Myth and Its Interruption

Political myth can be defined as a narrative in light of which a community is produced as a community. It is, a Jean-Luc Nancy argues, "the *incantation* that gives rise to a world and brings forth a language, that gives rise to a



world in the advent of language” (Nancy 50). Very often, however, the function of political myth is to exclude and silence just as much as it is to found and give identity to a community. In his posthumous work, *The Myth of the State*, Ernst Cassirer elucidates the dangers of political myth by detailing the ways in which its essential concerns led to the rise of fascism in Nazi Germany. Myth, the ancient Other of philosophy, he argues, has been injected into modern politics in such a way that philosophy has become impotent against the whims of modern political leaders.

Like Spinoza, Cassirer here understands that a community is much more securely bound together by imagination than rational discourse. Especially in times of social strife, fearful people are unwilling to look to themselves as free, rational individuals, but look instead for a great hero, whose actions and assurances provide the people with hope for their safety and security. “Here, he writes, “the totalitarian state and the political myths step in. The new political parties promise, at least, an escape from the dilemma. They suppress and destroy the very sense of freedom; but, at the same time, they relieve men from all personal responsibility” (Cassirer 288). In such times, the people elevate their leader into the role of a magician and a soothsayer. Her words have real material effects on the world, and when she speaks of a future victory for her people, this pronouncement is taken as certain (Cassirer 288). Discourse is divested of its denotative sense and re-invested with primarily emotive narratives, which, despite placing the people in a passive position, continue to speak about freedom. The combination of mythical language and collective fusion makes it very difficult for philosophy to gain a foothold. However, Cassirer argues that the philosopher nonetheless retains a certain responsibility in these times. “It is beyond the power of philosophy to destroy the political myths...” he says, “But philosophy can do us another important service. It can make us understand the adversary. In order to fight an enemy you must know him” (Cassirer 296).

However, we are left with the question of what it means to ‘know’ in this case. If political myth is a province of the imagination, these myths can take a



potentially infinite number of forms. And, given the influence that these myths have even over the language we use to describe our current situation, they may be interwoven into the fabric of our social existence so tightly that an examination of their substance in terms of facts or objective measures may be impossible. As Chiara Bottici has recently written: “Political myths...are not only what we perceive about the world of politics, but also the lens through which we perceive it” (Bottici 253). We may never think to question them.

Along with Cassirer and Bottici, Jean-Luc Nancy argues that myth is immune to truth. It is “its own enunciation, its own *tautegory*, equivalent to its own truth and its own realization” (Nancy 51). In this case, the task of the political philosopher, therefore, cannot be a fleeing or demythologizing of society; I argue instead that philosophy’s charge to know myth must be for the sake of using myth against itself on its own terms. The production of myth can no longer be seen as philosophy’s Other, but must be engaged as the truest form of philosophical and political practice. Insofar as myth cannot be done away with, it must be “interrupted” by other myths, ones that do not seek to close the community in fear against outsiders, but leave a community exposed to the voices of those that violent myth would seek to divest of a voice. As Nancy says, only “the interruption of myth defines the possibility of a “passion” equal to mythic passion” (Nancy 61). By direct engagement in the production of our own political myths, I conclude, we can also hope to interrupt the impulse to surrender our autonomy to the spell of our political leaders.

Sat 12:10 Dániel Corsano: Political Rationalism: Problem or Solution?

Political philosophy is unique among the disciplines of philosophy in that while the questions it concerns itself with aren’t any less abstract than those of other areas, the consequences of the answers are concrete. Two philosophers discussing the philosophy of mind may freely argue until the



end of time without coming to any conclusion on whether Russellian monism or physicalism is the superior metaphysical theory, just for the sake of mapping logical space, but if the question is which, if any, form of taxation is just, regardless of consensus not being any easier to attain, someone has to make a decision at some point.

Political theories are aimed at changing lives, which puts, or should put, a lot of pressure on the political philosopher to take into account two considerations that are irrelevant in other areas of philosophy: whether the theory results in policies that can realistically be implemented, and what kind of effect these policies would have on the population. Theories or the conceptions of state resulting from them are often evaluated on the basis of cost, morality, popularity, them being dangerous or shown effective or ineffective with empirical or other methods that are not philosophically rigorous but might still be indicative to some degree, while to raise such concerns about theories on metaphysics or the philosophy of language would be ridiculous. In fact, which, if any, of these extratheoretical concerns should enter the evaluation of political theories is an important meta-question of political philosophy, and how it should be answered raises other meta-questions, making a rational decision about which policy to implement seem even more unattainable than such a decision between two metaphysical theories. Nevertheless the machines of government are rolling and choices have to be made, or more like, shall be made, whether the political philosopher manages to contribute to it or not.

This discord between the method of philosophy and the purpose of politics is itself an important theme in political thought. Oakeshott, the conservative political philosopher famously raised his voice in the essay titled *Rationalism in Politics* against theoretically construed ideologies seeking to demolish existing political systems and rebuild them on new philosophical foundations, upholding instead the importance of practical knowledge, tradition and the intricate balance of interconnected institutions and policies that arose



through the course of history: to stick with what is proven good instead of taking a gambit with what looks good on paper.

Oakeshott saw dangers in the advent of socialism in post-war Britain, and warns that while such ideologies advocating increased government intervention in people's lives and the economy seem effective in theory, and the moral principles grounding them seem acceptable, such evaluations by fallible human beings with limited knowledge are far from being trustworthy. However, Oakeshott is himself making a philosophical claim about the legitimacy of forms of government, and the very institutions he seeks to preserve are themselves mainly products of the political thought of the Enlightenment, a movement that sought to place politics on rational foundations instead of tradition, motivated by faith in the reason and responsibility of the individual.

In my presentation I will argue that Oakeshott was right to be worried about the theorizing of some people intruding upon the lives of others, but wrong in doubting the importance of reason in evaluating political theories. In fact, I claim, in accord with the thinkers of the enlightenment, that there is no more universal and trustworthy method in which we could place our trust, especially when it comes to evaluating questions as important as the right forms of government.

Sat 13:40 János Laki: Philosophy and Science

Contemporary philosophy seems unable to give a definite account of the ultimate cognitive value of science. Advocates of an a priori-normative approach present it as a methodology-driven enterprise whose cognitive success can only be explained in a realistic fashion. Confirmed predictions, plausible explanations, and effective causal manipulation of the phenomena are considered possible because science provides true theories about reality. Others point out that even false theories can allow for such pragmatic



success for a long period of time, while historically-minded philosophers remind us that methodological norms and epistemic criteria have changed in the course of history, thus increasing success cannot be attributed to truth that is unchangeable.

The thesis I intend to advance in this lecture is that this ambiguity is a consequence of an inappropriate epistemology that conceives scientific knowledge as produced in individual minds. This epistemology is individualist, evidentialist, belief-centred, and as such, it suggests that psychology is the prototype discipline to be used in interpreting scientific cognition. As an alternative, I outline a collectivist, externalist epistemological framework that takes jurisdiction as its model and thus raises hopes for an adequate understanding of the cognitive specificity of science.

Sat 14:40 Serdal Tümkaya: The Overlaps between Philosophy and Science

No academic discipline has its own distinct nature or *the method*. Philosophy, at least its scholarly version, is not an exception. In customary words, philosophy is continuous with science. However, the real problem is to determine the precise meaning of that claim. I propose that this continuity claim is meaningful in the case it does not imply that philosophy should become a rigorous science, while philosophy should not be opposed to science. Both science and philosophy use a variety of methods, and the knowledge attained by both of them is open to revision. Inter-subjective critique is crucial for both of them. Yet, science is not something unitary. Neither is philosophy. Under the heading of science, we have many academic disciplines, which have highly different topics, concepts, methods, and precision, in mind. The followings are some examples: physics, mathematics, computer and cognitive sciences, life sciences, behavioral sciences, chemistry, geology, metallurgy, medical sciences, engineering, architecture, economics, public administration, political science, history, archeology, anthropology, geography, sociology, cultural studies, and many others.



Some would say that the continuity claim is rather relevant to the relationship between philosophy and natural science, or more particularly to physics. Since natural sciences are not quite homogeneous, my claim (i.e. neither science nor philosophy is unitary) makes the claim that philosophy is continuous with science much less strong. Thus, the continuity claim becomes more tenable.

More concretely, there should be no *categorical* distinction between academic disciplines, including philosophy. What we should do is to trace the problems, not the academic borders. Great philosophers, such as Aristotle and Kant, had always engaged in the sciences of their time. After all, the way philosophy is being done has always been under dynamic change. For that reason, it is reasonable to anticipate that philosophy will continue to change. The direction of this dynamic change cannot be “precisely” predicted in advance. However, there is every reason to think that forthcoming philosophy will be more science-friendly.

Defending a science-friendly philosophy does not entail holding “the traditional physicalism, wholesale reductionism, or eliminativism”. It means that almost all problems in philosophy would benefit from scientific knowledge. There is no a priori answer to the question of “how these benefits can be gained”. It depends on the problem at hand, the stage of the development of a particular science, and social parameters.

The systematic research should not *only* imply “controlled experimentation, mathematical formalization, or systematic empirical observation”. Of course, they are natural elements of some sciences, but not of all. On the other hand, mathematical formalism is very similar to “logical formalism”, which is a widely-held tool used by analytical philosophers. Empirical observation had been done, for example by Aristoteles, one of the greatest philosophers of all times. Today, the neurophilosophers are regularly drawing on “the systematic empirical observations and controlled experimentation”.



I am not suggesting having a 'scientific-turn' in philosophy, humanities, or social sciences once more. We have enough of them. In fact, a more suitable expression for my idea should be 'social-turn' in natural sciences. But do not many so-called "integrated approaches, biopsychosocial models, and all those developmental and epigenetics views" already exist? What is the point of suggesting a new one? Here is my answer:

- i) These views approach to social sciences as if social scientific findings require much less scientific rigor than natural sciences do. It is a very serious defect of them. This defect should be overcome.
- ii) These approaches focus on micro-social issues by using micro-social scientific findings.
- iii) Macro-social issues and macro-social findings should be incorporated into them.

Sat 15:10 Luca Demontis: What Kind of Science is History? On Isaiah Berlin's methodological dualism between the natural sciences and the humanities

In this paper we will try to clarify some of the philosophical implications of Isaiah Berlin's (1909-1997) methodological dualism.

We will proceed as follows: in the first part, we will explain why he defends the autonomy of the humanities in front of the natural sciences; in his opinion, a unified methodology to include all sciences is nothing less than "one of the most grotesque claims ever made by human beings". We will argue that his main critical target is the application to the social sciences of the deductive-nomological model, theorized in particular by Carl Gustav Hempel, according to which the historical explanation of a particular event must be based on covering laws as general as possible. According to Berlin, this claim is due to a false analogy, which leads us to systematically misunderstand our legitimate expectations in front of the social sciences.



Dazzled by the achievements of the natural sciences, social scientists cultivate the illusion of extending to their disciplines something similar to the galileian model of an experiment repeatable under uniform conditions, the results of which could be objectively evaluated by means of quantitative and statistical data. By working this way, they risk to confine themselves into a reductionist and “procustean” vision of the world, which leads them to mistake the part, composed by these parameters, with the whole society that they seek to explain.

In the second part, we will see in more detail that the mistake originates precisely by the ambition to achieve in the social sciences the same degree of axiomatization, internal consistency, formal elegance and explanatory simplicity that we look for in the natural sciences. Berlin's opinion is that these cognitive values are inversely proportional to the accuracy in the empirical study of society: the higher is the internal coherence of a social theory, the lower is its grasp on reality. In short, the sternness of Berlin's dualism has to be read as a “dam” against the scientific imperialism that the hard sciences constantly tend to exercise over the humanities, by virtue of their undeniable successes.

In the third part, we will approach the problem by focusing on Berlin's history of ideas. While the Enlightenment tradition took for granted that Truth was characterized by the positive attributes of uniformity, simplicity and eternal validity, authors such as Giambattista Vico and Johann Gottfried Herder introduced the revolutionary assumption that our idea of truth depends on historical epochs and social contexts. In doing so, they shook our faith in an external and objective truth, existing independently from us and that we simply have to unearth: cognitive values such as variety and diversity, particularism and pluralism began to be taken into positive account. These ideas reached their full expression during the Romantic Age, and they gave rise to the conditions of possibility of a proper methodological dualism. In this respect, we will hold that Isaiah Berlin's epistemological assumptions are deeply indebted to Vico's notion of “fantasia”: the logical positivists'



“quest for certainty” blamed by Berlin is, in fact, akin to the criticism against the certumthat Vico developed in answer to Enlightenmentationalism.

We will conclude with some considerations on the relationship between the positive social sciences - such as economics and sociology - and the humanities, suggested by Berlin's reflections. Obviously we should not completely ignore the tools offered by positive sciences, but rather bring their task back to an heuristic one. Therefore, the sophisticated theories proposed by economists and sociologists are not descriptions of reality, neither, on the contrary, pure intellectual speculations. Rather, they are useful means to increase our ordinary sense of reality: they continually offer new possible interpretations of reality, but they'll never reach what Richard Rorty would have called a Mirroring of Nature.

**Sat 15:50 Tolgahan Toy: Advocacy of Science vs Scientific Methodology
A Comparison between two philosophers from the analytical
tradition: Quine and Sider**

Quine considers philosophy as in the same boat with science. So our approach to meaning must be naturalistic. What I understand by naturalism is starting from observations about how a term is used. For example, a physicist uses all the relevant observations for his/her research. For Quine, a philosopher should appeal to observations relevant to their subject. By 'observation' I do not mean just any observation. For example, observing the street or observing the motion of a certain object is irrelevant when it comes to understand meaning. Similarly, chemistry, physics, biology, sociology, and psychology all have their own distinctive observations. To understand meaning we should observe language. How can we observe language? We can observe the behavior, sounds...etc. However, philosophers for two thousand years have been working on more serious and theoretical issues instead of working on practical issues. To understand the meaning of 'existence', 'truth', 'experience', 'mind' and many other fundamental items



that philosophers have been working on; they are not interested in observing language. Of course, an exception to that has been the "ordinary language philosophers." But their influence is decreasing. Today, many philosophers are following the classical tradition. For example, Sider claims that his metaphysics is "largely a priori." However, Quine's naturalism wants not only science but also philosophy to appeal to observations.

Let me elaborate this Quine-Sider comparison. First of all, I am aware that Sider is also a naturalist in one sense. He doesn't appeal to supernatural beings. He appeals to natural sciences. In this sense Sider is one of the most prominent naturalists. However, by naturalism what I mean is the methodology we follow when we do *our job*.

Naturalism as I understand is about how we do our job, not about what we defend. For me, defending naturalism and being naturalist are quite different things, just like defending democracy and being a democrat are two different things. One might defend democracy in antidemocratic ways. So, Quine thinks that it is not up to some prior philosophy to give the picture of reality. It implies that even though the picture given by some prior philosophy defends science, it would still be anti-naturalist. Quine's naturalism does not rule out a scientific study of our evolution and the concept of reality. This is an important point because a metaphysical defense of physics and its posits might not allow us to study the relation between Homo sapiens and their sciences but Quinean naturalism does allow us to do this. What is most fundamental here is the scientific method; we can investigate or doubt science, but only by appeal to the scientific method.

On the other hand, Sider's philosophy is not compatible with the kind of naturalism I sketched above. As I said above, one might defend science but this doesn't mean that he is a methodological naturalist. Sider says "I am after the truth about what there is, what the world is really like. So I do not want merely to describe anyone's conceptual scheme, not even if that scheme was thrust upon us by evolution. Nor am I trying to read off an ontology from the pages of the latest physics journals. Even the quickest scan



through this book will make it clear that the reasons I provide for my conclusions are largely a priori. ... Let's not kid ourselves: metaphysics is highly speculative."

So, Sider claims that he is working on reality through a priori reasoning. Besides, he accepts that he doesn't have any good answer when it is asked "why think that a priori reasoning about synthetic matters of fact is justified". However, he claims that there is no problem with not providing an answer, because in mathematics or physics, justifications do not come first either. "Mathematics did not proceed foundations-first. Nor did physics. Nor has ethics, traditionally. It may well be that the epistemological foundations of speculative are particularly difficult to secure." So, Sider commits himself to doing speculative metaphysics. However, as we have seen above, Quine refuses that.

**Sat 16:20 Tomasz Szubart: On the Role of Philosophy in Cognitive Science/
On the Role of Cognitive Science in Philosophy: The Case of
Explanation**

In recent years, several approaches to the understanding of the role of philosophy in cognitive science have been presented. If we understand cognitive science as an interdisciplinary conglomerate of several independent empirical and less empirical disciplines, which are connected by the attempt to explain the phenomena of *mind*, then it seems inevitable that philosophers will find a theoretical place there. In one of the models, rooted in the neo-positivistic metaphilosophy, the role of philosophy in cognitive science would be simply to provide an analysis of general abstract concepts employed in particular sciences. As it is the mind, that is a point of interest, there happens to be many philosophically loaded concepts. At least for some philosophers, who wish so.

The aim of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of several approaches in the contemporary philosophy of cognitive science that deal with stated



problem. On the other hand, we will also try to examine some of the views on the role of cognitive science in philosophy offered in recent days. As the spectrum is quite broad – from non-reductive eliminativism to anti-empiricism – we will focus only on one – exemplary, but crucial from the point of view of philosophy of science – topic, which is the problem of explanation.

Sat 16:50 Elena Popa: Causal Explanation: Philosophical and Psychological Issues

In my talk I will be concerned with some interactions between philosophical work on scientific explanation and experimental data on causal perception and causal learning. One issue present in the debate between Waskan (2011) and Woodward (2011) over the choice between mechanistic and counterfactual models of causal explanation concerns the connection between explanation and developmental data on causal reasoning. Waskan relies on experimental data from a study by Schlotmann (1999) where temporal cues and mechanism information are used to infer causal relations. Waskan goes along with the authors' conclusion that that at a younger age causal perception (given by temporal information) comes before mechanism information and that, later on, this relation is reversed. Waskan proceeds to define his concept of cause as mechanical necessitation on this basis and, he further articulates his theory of explanation based on actual causation.

Woodward's reply with regard to the cognitive development data is that the adult notion of causation cannot be fully derived from causal perception and information on mechanisms, and that it needs to integrate considerations about difference-making. One thing to point out is that Woodward's reply makes use of his distinction between the difference-making and the geometrical-mechanical concept of causation. His criticism toward Waskan's account seems to come down to the fact that difference-making information cannot be reduced to mechanism and causal perception information. While

the cognitive development data on bootstrapping to the adult concept of causation is by and large an empirical issue, I would like to point to some philosophical issues concerning the relations between the philosophical and the scientific work on causation and explanation.

The first thing to note is that on both accounts causal explanation is taken to have something in common with people's understanding of causal concepts. From this perspective, scientific data can be taken to provide new leads concerning the features that a theory of causal explanation should exhibit. Secondly, while the debate is about scientific explanation and its connection to cognitive development data, certain problems and distinctions associated with the metaphysics of causation seem to be highly significant for the debate. One of them concerns the idea that there are several, as opposed to one concept of causation meant to account for different uses of the term. In this case, the mechanical necessitation relation is of use when one is interested in actual causation cases, while the counterfactual theory provides more information on properties such as stability or invariance. The other essentially philosophical issue at stake in the debate concerns which concept, or which approach to explanation, should be more fundamental. Waskan and Woodward seem to advocate for their own accounts. I find this issue especially interesting in relation to Woodward's account since his full account, as a general theory about causation, does not pursue a reductive analysis of causation. Nevertheless, in his criticism of the mechanistic approach to causal explanation he takes his difference-making view to be, if not more fundamental, at least not reducible to mechanism information.

The more general conclusion springing from this investigation is that while recent work on scientific explanation draws from experimental data on causal learning it also keeps important distinctions and problems from the philosophical issue of causation.



15 February SUNDAY

Sun 10:00 Gábor Boros: On Philosophical Presuppositions of History(ies) of Philosophy

My basic idea is that on the one hand, there is no inherent necessity to presuppose the univocity between the capacities and abilities of human intellect and the basic ratio guiding the providential or evolutionary forces behind the development of history. On the other hand, the methods and the means by which the historical materials are to be processed have developed to the point where it seems to be possible or imperative to reckon with a complex structure or texture of parallel running series of events in any of the periods of the history of philosophy.

Some implications of this basic shift of viewpoint:

Our starting point will be the ever-complex character of philosophy in any given period.

No claim will be made to an a priori access to the True Meaning of History. It will be illegitimate and historically misleading to speak about something like a “historical mission” of a philosophy.

When looking for the appropriate denominations of philosophies or tendencies within philosophy preference will have to be given to the intrinsic-positive denominations as opposed to the extrinsic-negative ones like those starting with the particle “counter-”.

After a preparatory overview over the respective interplays of traditional and new philosophies in the different chronological periods, considerable efforts will have to be made to determine independently from the traditional way the periods of the history of philosophy. Preference is to be given to intrinsic-positive denominations as opposed to extrinsic-negative ones whose most important examples are “Middle Ages” and “Renaissance”.



To sum it up: history is not a unilinear development that can and must be recited in one single narrative comprising all what happened. History is a rather plurilinear development that can be recited in different narratives, which is all the more advantageous for it. Just like in a ski-region with numerous slopes and routes and various elevators that are not designed to run parallel or complementing each other in order to come to the highest peak in the end – there is no such end. What there is, is a great variety of possible combinations of the different routes.

Sun 11:00 Botond Csuka: “Looking upon the World, as it were in another Light”: The Beginnings of the Discourse of the Aesthetic

Although the title I have chosen may seem too lofty, the question concerning the origins of modern aesthetics is a practical difficulty that every historian of the subject-matter must face: which are the notions (or often counter-notions), ideas, texts, authors or tendencies of thought that can be relevant to the historical accounts trying to narrate the formation of aesthetics? First, I am going to delineate the common interpretations of the term “aesthetics” – a systematical philosophical discipline that endeavours to understand sensitive cognition (A. Baumgarten), philosophy of art (or of artworks), or philosophy of beauty (and of other aesthetic categories) –, and emphasize, that according to these differing conceptions the genealogy of aesthetics will multiply, and will lead deep into the territories of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century logics or empiricism and sensualism, poetics or rhetoric, or the long history of metaphysics of beauty. However, I will consider another possibility.

I argue, that apart from the common interpretations of the term “aesthetics”, there exists another plausible interpretation: aesthetics as a specifically modern *discourse*, that was gradually built around and produced a certain relation to the things in the world, a certain kind of experience, which we would call “aesthetic experience”. Focusing on this conception of the term, I



will consider some of the questions it generates and the approaches and advantages it offers, remaining mostly within the British discourse of the aesthetic. I suggest, that if we think of aesthetics as a modern discourse and attitude, it allows us to write narratives of the formation of aesthetics that are interdisciplinary, attentive to power relations or historical changes, moreover inclusive and open, which is crucial for re-thinking the identity of a discipline that has always operated on the margins and is inherently transgressive.

Sun 11:40 Ádám Smrcz: Filozófusok Salon des Refusés-je – avagy komolyan kell-e vennünk a kánonból kiszorult szerzőket?

Filozófiatörténet és „tulajdonképpen” filozófia viszonya köztudottan ambivalens. Ha a filozófiatörténet kezdeteire tekintünk vissza, úgy azt láthatjuk, hogy a kettő egykor élesen szemben is állt egymással: az ún. diadokhográfia ugyanis – szkeptikus érvként – annak révén kívánta bizonyítani bármiféle filozófiai megismerés lehetetlen voltát, hogy olyan filozófiai álláspontokat melyek, bár kölcsönösen kizárták egymást, mégis egyformán valószínűnek tűntek.

A modern értelemben vett filozófiatörténet szándéka azonban köztudottan más: ahelyett, hogy a filozófiát meggyőzőerejétől kívánná megfosztani, az eredeti műveket olyan jeletéstöbblettel látja el, melyet az eredeti munkák önmagukban nélkülöznek. Ennek bemutatása véget tervezett előadásomban arra teszek kísérletet, hogy bizonyos kanonikus szerzőket – ezen többletjelentés reményében - a kánonból kiszorult „kismemsterek” felől *visszafelé olvasok*. Mindez azt tenné lehetővé, hogy az adott vita kontextusát feltárjuk, végső soron pedig az elemzett kanonikus művekben implicit módon bennefoglalt filozófiai tartalmakat explikálni tudjuk.

A fenti módszer egyúttal nyilvánvalóan történeti nehézségek elé állítja az olvasót: a diadokhográfia példájához visszatérve azt látjuk ugyanis, hogy a kezdeti filozófiatörténet-írás intézményileg ténylegesen létező filozófiai



iskolák történetével foglalkozik, annak modern jogutódja viszont sokszor hiposztazált, és legfeljebb nominálisan létező irányzatok történetét beszéli el.

Az egymással ténylegesen kontextusban álló, egymást pedig ennél fogva kölcsönösen megvilágítani képes szövegek hermeneutikai vizsgálatához a történetiség megfelelő vizsgálata ennél fogva nélkülözhetetlen feltétel. Tervezett előadásomban kora modern példákon igyekszem tehát bemutatni majd, hogy egy újból megkonstruált történeti kontextus miképpen készíthet minket arra, hogy a kánonon ezidáig kívülrekedő szerzőket újraértékeljük.

Sun 12:10 Péter Tánczos: „A monda jó öreg Saturnusa” – Friedrich Schlegel entuziasztikus Spinoza-értelmezése

Friedrich Schlegel *Transzcendentálfilozófia* című jénai jegyzeteiben az újkori filozófiatörténet két legjelentősebb képviselőjét Spinoza és Fichte alakjában fedezi fel, munkásságuk szimmetriájában találja meg az ellentétek szintézisét, a korszak lényegét. Schlegel azonban nem csupán történeti jelentőséget tulajdonít a két gondolkodónak, hanem a két következetes és érvényes módszer, a spekulatív és a reflexív filozófia voltaképpen megteremtőjét is bennük látja – némileg átértelmezve Fichte különbségtévesztését a kritikai és a spinozai rendszer között. Az experimentális filozófia projektuma szerint minden gondolkodónak teljesen előlről kell kezdenie a gondolkodást, így minden filozófiai kísérletnek át kell esnie a tévedés nagy korszakain, végig kell járnia az „emberi értelem történetét”, tehát szembesülnie kell Fichte és Spinoza rendszerével is.

Előadásomban arra tennék kísérletet, hogy a *Transzcendentálfilozófia* fenti alapállásából kiindulva rekonstruáljam Friedrich Schlegel Spinoza-értelmezését. A jénai korszak műveiben Schlegel időről időre problematizálja saját rajongó Spinoza-élményét: számos módon próbál megoldást találni a maga teoretikus pozíciója és a filozófus-elődhez való affirmatív viszonyulása közötti ellentmondásra. Fragmentumaiban és *Beszélgetés a költészetről* című munkájában elsősorban Spinoza történeti érvényességére helyezi a



hangsúlyt, ebben látja ugyanis a méltatás és a távolságtartás együttes lehetőségét: „letaszított Saturnusként” Spinoza nosztalgikus vágyakozás tárgya lehet, és megnyílhat az út az új, értőbb recepció előtt. Schlegel szellemi elődjében, akit szerinte a kor még legfeljebb csak következetes rendszere miatt csodál, mindenekelőtt az entuziazmus nagy gondolkodóját látja. Spinoza munkásságát ezért legtöbbször a költészet és a fenséges legtágabban értett esztétikai kontextusában tárgyalja.

Schlegel folyton változó filozófiatörténeti modelljét elsősorban az intellektuális ízlése és teoretikus alapállása között feszülő inkongruencia hívta életre, a történeti megközelítés melletti elkötelezettsége tehát egy személyes problémából bontakozott ki. Ezzel a historizáló attitűddel azonban nem eltüntetni vagy semlegesíteni akarta elődeit, hanem igazán élővé és saját közegükben értelmezhetővé kívánta őket tenni. Az előadásban Schlegel Spinozáról rajzolt (deleuze-i értelemben vett) portróját mint történeti felfogásának kulcsát szeretném bemutatni.

Sun 13:30 Ferenc Takó: Ahogy mi szívesen képzeljük: Max Weber és az „egyetemes”

Felcsapom Weber műveit. Nem találomra, de nem keresgélek hosszan. 1904: „Aki végiggondolja a modern ismeretelmélet Kanttól eredő alapgondolatát, hogy márpedig a fogalmak az empirikusan adott feletti szellemi uralmat szolgáló gondolati eszközök és nem is lehetnek mások, az nem lát okot a pontos genetikus fogalmak elvetésére azért, mert azok szükségképpen ideáltípusok.” Ezeket „azért kell mindenkor szükségképpen pontosan megfogalmazni, mert a történeti fogalmak tartalma szükségképpen változó.” 1908: A protestantizmus tanulmányokat „nem olvasók számára is kellőképpen világossá válik pusztán a Kritikusom által [...] idézett szavakból (vallási tudattartalmak »hatása« a kulturális életre), hogy nem kíséreltem meg valamely korszak »történeti eseményei mögött munkáló tényezőket« vagy bizonyos »valódi hajtóerőket« fellelni: – efféle kísértések ugyanis



számomra a történelemben nem léteznek”, hanem „azt vizsgáltam, milyen *irányban* befolyásolták az életvezetést” a protestantizmus egyes ágai „*ott, ahol* ilyen hatás *egyáltalán* megjelent.” 1915: A nagy vallások „nem tagolhatók be típusok egyszerű láncolatába, amelyek mindegyike a többihez képest új »lépcsőfokot« jelentene.”

Szemezgetvén arra jutok, vagy inkább: *szívesen képzelem*, hogy Weber végleg szakít azzal a bő két évszázaddal, amely a történelmet *egyetemes* fejlődési folyamatként szemlélte. Hogyan olvassuk viszont a passzust, amellyel az *e módszertani alapvetésekre épülő* főműveinek gyűjteményét megnyitja? 1920: „A modern európai kultúrán nevelkedett ember elkerülhetetlenül [!] és jogosan [!] a következő kérdésfeltevés fényében közelíti meg az egyetemes [!] történelmi problémákat: a körülmények miféle láncolata [!] vezetett oda, hogy éppen a Nyugat talaján és csakis itt [!] tűntek fel olyan kulturális jelenségek, amelyek – legalábbis ahogy mi [!] szívesen képzeljük – *egyetemes* jelentőségű és érvényű [!] fejlődés [!] irányába mutattak?” E mondatot értelmezem előadásomban.

Sun 14:00 **Ádám Tuboly: A Der logische Aufbau der Welt kontinentális gyökerei**

Az utóbbi években egyre erőteljesebb az a filozófiatörténeti perspektíva, miszerint a Carnap filozófiai nézeteiről kialakult hivatalos kép átfogó revízióra szorul. Számos filozófiatörténész érvelt amellett, hogy az elterjedt Carnap-interpretáció jelentősen leegyszerűsített, eredeti kontextusából kiragadott és szinte karikatúra jellegű. A legátfogóbb történeti rehabilitáció fókuszában Carnap korai főműve a Der logische Aufbau der Welt áll, így előadásomban ennek a műnek a kortárs kvázi-recepciójáról beszélnek. A fő kérdés, hogy mi az a filozófiai tradíció és módszertan, amibe Carnap könyve konzisztens és koherens módon beilleszthető, mi az a kontextus, amiben az Aufbau struktúrája, kérdésfelvetése és gondolatvilága szubtilis módon értelmezhető.



Az ezekről a kérdésekről kialakult hivatalos kép (az „angol-olvasat”) szerint az Aufbau egy empirista munka, a klasszikus brit empirizmus betetőzője Bertrand Russell logikai munkásságának felhasználásával. Ezen felül a mű fundacionalista, vagyis a tudásunk kizárólagos, sziklaszilárd és megbízható fundamentumának felderítésére törekszik. A harmadik jellegzetesség pedig Carnap fenomenalizmusa, ami szerint az említett fundamentumot Carnap a kellőképp izolálható, atomisztikus érzet-adatokban találta meg (ami egybecsengene a klasszikus brit empirizmus atomizmusával és Russell átmeneti fenomenalizmusával). Ezek alapján az Aufbau az analitikus filozófia magnum opusa.

Mindazonáltal az Aufbau figyelmes olvasata, filozófia és kultúrtörténeti kontextusának feltárása arra mutat, hogy a fenti karakterizáció nem állja meg a helyét. Előadásomban a legújabb kutatások eredményeit kívánom prezentálni, kitérve az Aufbau neo-kantiánus és husserliánus gyökereire (az Aufbau „német-”, továbbá „osztrák-olvasata”). Emellett vázolom az Aufbau egy eddig nem vizsgált lehetséges háttérelemét, nevezetesen a szellemtudományokmegközelítését, ugyanis a mű egyes passzusai arra mutatnak, hogy az átfogó megértés érdekében tovább kell tágítanunk az Aufbauhoz kapcsolódó történeti perspektívánkat, ugyanis a könyv kontinentális gyökerei jóval mélyebbre nyúlnak, mint gondolni szokás. Ebből kifolyólag pedig az Aufbau kapcsán úgy tűnik, hogy revízióra szorul az „analitikus” és „kontinentális” filozófia címkéje is.

Sun 14:30 Fazakas István: Philosophy-Fiction: A fikció szerepe a filozófiában

A filozófiai hagyományt a lehető legkülönbözőbb formákban áthatja a fikció. Nem csak arról van szó, hogy a filozófusok gyakran támaszkodnak nem-filozófiai fiktív elemekre, hanem elsősorban arról, hogy a filozófiai hagyomány maga is kitermelt többféle fikciót, úgy műfaji mint tartalmi szempontból. A fikció ilyen mértékű jelenléte a filozófiában több kérdést is



felvet: milyen szerep jut a képzeletnek a filozófia művelésében? Létezik-e egy sajátosan filozófiai „képzelőerő”? Mi különbözteti meg a filozófiai fikciót más – például irodalmi – fikciótól?

Előadásomban ezt a kérdéskört járom körül, különös figyelmet fordítva Marc Richir munkásságára és a kortárs fenomenológia „spekulatív” vagy „konstruktív” elemeire melyek esetében ezek a kérdések sajátos módon tevődnek fel. Richir életművének egyik legfontosabb eleme a *phantasia* mezejének felfedezése melyben ő maga a fenomenológia egy sajátos megújítási lehetőségét látja. Egyes kritikusai ellenben írásait „métaphysique-fiction”-nak azaz „metafizikus-fantasztikus irodalomnak” bélyegezték. Egy, a fikciót témává tevő filozófiával van-e tehát dolgunk, vagy egy a filozófiát elképzelő fikcióról? És ha a konstruktív fenomenológia – annak husserli változatával ellentétben – a képzelőerő elsőbbségéből indul ki a tapasztalattal szemben, hol húzódik a határ – és mi garantálja, hogy egyáltalán van ilyen – a fikció filozófiai alkalmazása és a filozófia fikciová válása között?

Sun 15:10 Anna Réz: Philosophers in the Public Discourse

To develop the profile of some sort of a public intellectual a philosopher can pursue two main strategies. First, one can take on more or less traditional philosophical issues and present them in an approachable fashion, thus popularizing philosophy as a scientific discipline. Second, one can take a stand on current, directly non-philosophical public debates, while maintaining an essentially philosophical approach to the subject matter. I find this latter method more fruitful and effective in reaching a wider audience and informing them about the merits of philosophical thinking (here I take it for granted that it is a good thing in itself if at least some philosophers gain wider recognition in the given society). In my talk I will present some conceptual distinctions, methodological assumptions and key messages,



which can be usefully brought into the current Hungarian public discourse by a particularly philosophical standpoint.

Sun 16:10 Zsolt Kapelner: What can we offer?

In my talk I address the following question: “What can philosophy offer to the wider, that is, non-academic, public?” The grim reality of today is that philosophy plays little to no role in public debates, policy making, education, or the forming of the public opinion. This, I believe, is due neither to the ignorance of the public, nor to the insufficient branding of the discipline, but rather to the fact that philosophy, as it is practiced today, has virtually nothing to offer to non-philosophers. Philosophical discussions usually confine themselves to highly technical topics while paying less and less attention to what importance these topics bear to our lives. Some philosophers, many of whom, unfortunately, are held in the highest esteem, such as Saul Kripke, Scott Soames, or Timothy Williamson, even go as far as self-consciously proclaim that valuable philosophy should detach itself from everyday realities and should not posit as its goal the enhancement of human life. These attitudes leave their mark not only on the traditionally abstract areas such as philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, but also on moral and political philosophy where scholastic debates on nuances of certain authors’ theories are just as common as in any other area. Furthermore, even when philosophical debate is free of that attitude and it produces knowledge of actual, moral or material, value to non-philosophers, that knowledge is almost never able to reach non-academic audiences. The work of the vast majority of professional philosophers all around the world goes by and large unnoticed. I claim that this is not only a problem because it jeopardizes the place of philosophy within academia, which becomes more and more hostile to disciplines with little practical utility, but also because philosophers, just like other scholars, have a moral obligation to justify their practice to the rest of society which enables that practice to be continued. As long as philosophy is de



facto inaccessible and, as a consequence, morally and materially worthless to the majority of those people whose efforts, time, and money make the practice of philosophers possible, it fails to live up to an ethical requirement without which it cannot be thought of as worthy of existence. The question, then, is as follows: can this requirement of justification be fulfilled? Is there anything philosophy can offer to the wider public? I argue that the answer is 'yes', however, contrary to widely held views, that which can be offered by philosophy to the world is neither doctrinal knowledge about philosophical problems, nor a manual of correct reasoning and critical thinking. The former is in and of itself of little value to the larger public, and the latter can very well be promoted by other disciplines. Instead, I believe that what philosophy can offer is a method for forming worldviews. By 'worldview' I do not mean a closed system of beliefs, but rather a set of consistent philosophical theses always amenable to analysis, reflection, and change. As of today, philosophy, by and large, produces theses and arguments, but not worldviews. Such worldviews, however, would greatly enhance our overall understanding of the world; they would help us spot where our disagreements lie, and what we really expect from our debates, policies, education, and so on and so forth. I hold with Slavoj Žižek that humanity faces challenges that require us to be most reflective and deliberate, and that in order to live up to that requirement, we all have to become philosophers in some sense. But for that to happen, philosophy itself has to change thoroughly.

Sun 16:40 Isik Sarihan: A Business Proposal to Fight against the Lack of Progress in Philosophy

Why is it that there is not much progress in philosophy? Many of us philosophers, at least many of those following the analytic tradition, believe that there are objective answers that can be obtained for the questions we are asking, and we believe that we have the right tools to obtain those answers: Conceptual analysis, reasoning through rules of logic, careful



phenomenological reflection, and probably others. There have indeed been progress in the tools used in philosophical argumentation and there is now also a more clear articulation of questions and theoretical options, but we philosophers have not agreed on any answers to the questions we have been asking for more than two thousand years, regarding the nature of time, objects, free will, knowledge, reality, the mind, justice, goodness, etc. Why is it so? Philosophers who reflect on the issue of progress in philosophy usually tend to investigate the nature of philosophical questions, the analytical methods we are using, and the nature of knowledge. Not much attention is given to the practical, social, professional and organizational side of the issue. The question of why there hasn't been much progress in answering philosophical questions might have a very simple and not-so-philosophical answer: We are not doing our work properly. We are not doing it properly not in the sense of reasoning in a wrong way or using the wrong analytical tools, but we are just not spending enough time on it, not putting enough effort in it, and we do not have the right kind of social structures within the profession that would lead to fruitful research. Most philosophers spend most of their work time not reflecting on philosophical questions per se, but preparing for classes, teaching, grading papers, reviewing literature, refereeing for journals and conferences, writing books and papers for publication, writing their doctoral thesis, doing administrative work, etc. Many of these academic activities do indeed involve reflecting on philosophical questions, but the bulk of the time spent on these do not really consists of philosophizing, and the social exchange between philosophers are done in a way that is too slow and much less systematic than it can ideally be. In this talk, I want to present a thought experiment where some imaginary philosophers conduct their professional work in a different manner. Instead of spending their time burdened with above activities, these philosophers collectively work on philosophical issues on a daily basis in a "philosophy factory", work in a way similar to how laboratory scientists or construction workers conduct their professional work every day. Each philosopher in the factory has a duty assigned: She either reviews literature to reconstruct



arguments, works to ascertain the logical validity or invalidity of such arguments, thinks of real and possible objections to the arguments, scrutinizes the validity of the work done by others in the factory, or writes a report about the results of the research and announces it to other offices worldwide for these reports to be collected and cross-examined globally in a transparent and non-hierarchical way, with the products of the global research being compiled on a growing and open online platform. If it is true that the philosophical methods we have now can ultimately lead us to objective knowledge, then this kind of philosophical conduct can provide us with a much more robust way of making progress, compared to the slow and ceremonial working process of the ordinary philosopher who works under many other burdens of academia and personal career. I will provide this thought experiment not to prove that the lack of organizational rigor is the primary cause behind the lack of progress in philosophy, but to put forward a positive proposal to point towards structures of professional conduct we can try to implement in the future at our academic institutions, which also have a surprising side-advantage of creating more jobs for philosophers.

Sun 17:20 Lilla Zelovich: A gondoskodás mint etikai és politikai érték

A hétköznapok alkalmával ritkán botlunk metafizikai, nyelv- vagy tudományfilozófiai kérdésekre irányuló vitákba, és azoknak a filozófusoknak, akik ezekhez az ágakhoz kapcsolódó kérdéseket bontogatnak, hosszabban kell érvelniük az utca emberének amellett, hogy munkájuk végül is nem öncélú tevékenység.

Az etikai dilemmák azonban rendszeresen készítenek minket megállásra a mindennapi cselekvéseinkben. Az embertársainkra, a környezetünkre hatással vannak a döntéseink, összhangot kell teremtenünk a saját és mások érdekei között, és az etikai elméletek ezeknek a konfliktusoknak a feloldásában próbálnak útmutatóul szolgálni.



Előadásomban amellet szeretnék érvelni, hogy a gondoskodás etikája a klasszikus etikai irányzatokhoz képest is különösen praktikus és kontextus-érzékeny vonal a filozófiában.

A gondoskodás etikája egy viszonylag friss irányzat, és alapvetően a domináns, erősen racionalizált igazságosság–központú elméletekkel helyezkedett szembe, azok kritikájából nőtte ki magát. A kanti deontikus és az utilitarista elméletek teoretikus teljesítményük ellenére a gyakorlatban sokszor tűntek rigidnek és konstraintívnek, a körülményekre és a szereplők igényeire, indokaira vak szabályrendszernek.

A gondoskodás etikája ezeknek az elméleteknek és a liberális politikában is megjelenő szűken értelmezett emberképnek a hiányosságait próbálta felülírni. A gondoskodói attitűdöt nemcsak morális, de politikai értéknek is tekintette, az emberi élet meghatározó elemének, amit szem előtt tartva, az embereket egymásra utalt személyeknek látta. Se nem egyértelműen autonómnak, se nem függésben lévőnek, de olyanoknak, akiknek a felelőssége, cselekedeteinek irányultsága, szerepei élethelyzetektől függően változik.

A kölcsönös és rendszeres függésben levés hangsúlyozása maga után vonja a szociális tevékenységek tekintélyét, és egyben teret ad a hatalmi pozíciók és a velük járó előnyök felosztásának újraértelmezésére. A gondoskodás etikája a társadalmi egyenlőtlenségek feltérképezésére és a hátrányos helyzetű csoportok felszámolására törekszik azáltal, hogy a gondoskodói ellátáshoz hozzáférők és az azt nyújtók viszonyait rendszerezni kívánja, valamint azáltal, hogy az ellátásra szorulókat igényeiket közvetlen érintkezésből és a saját alapjukról próbálja felmérni.

A gondoskodás etikája az univerzális érvényű elvek és absztrakt állítások helyett a konkrét igényekre, környezeti adottságokra és a direkt problémamegoldásokra összpontosít, tudatosan korigálva a klasszikus elméletek hiányosságait. Sürgeti a társadalomban fellépő akár egyéni, akár csoportos, konkrét szükségletekre adandó választ, felfrissítve az etika



emberekről alkotott képét, és közvetlenül is érintve a mindennapok problémáinak megoldását.

Sun 17:50 Dániel Asztalos: A filozófia és a segítő foglalkozások kapcsolata

Úgy tűnik, hogy az a filozófia, amely kezdetben minden tudomány forrása volt, a mi századunkra már elveszítette jelentőségét, tekintélyét. Véleményem szerint ebben a krízisben a filozófiának nagy lehetősége van, hiszen az általános vélekedés és ítélet – amely megkérdőjelezi tudományunk tudományosságát és hasznát – nyomást gyakorolhatna a filozófiát művelőkre, hogy a sokszor szőrszálhasogatónak tűnő viták helyett a valóban lényeges kérdésekhez térjenek vissza.

Feltevéseim szerint ilyen lényeges kérdés lehet a résztudományok eredményeit tágabb keretek között értelmezni. Számos lehetőséget látok a segítőfoglalkozások területén. Századunk emberét lenyűgözi a technika világa, mindenkinek a zsebében egy miniatűr számítógép lapul, s ennek a használatához nagyszerűen értünk, de ahhoz, hogy hogyan gondolkozunk létünkéről, céljainkról, morális felelősségünkéről, vagy éppen a környezetünk formálásáról és megóvásáról, arra sokszor nem vagyunk képesek választ adni.

A segítő foglalkozások; legyen szó orvoslásról, lélekgyógyászatról, vagy éppen pedagógiáról, eleve feltételeznek valamilyen egészség ideát, vagy emberképet, amely alapján szeretnék feladatukat ellátni. A lélekgyógyászatra szűkítve témánkat, láthatjuk, hogy itt is felmerülnek olyan dilemmák, amelyek szükségszerűen saját szakterületükhöz képest továbbkérdeneznek. Tringer László egyik cikkében a pszichoterápia és a filozófia kapcsolódási pontjait vizsgálja, és megállapítja, hogy eleve a pszichoterápia kezdetei nem mentesek a filozófiai hatásoktól, a különböző irányzatok párhuzamba állíthatóak a filozófiában is fellelhető irányvonalakkal, ráadásul létezik néhány olyan pszichoterápiás irányzat, amely kifejezetten filozófiai alapokon nyugszik. Itt utal Binswanger egzisztencia-analízisére, Frankl logoterápiás irányzatára. Tringer László



beszámolt arról is, hogy a lelki-betegségek mögött sokszor morális válság húzódik, amiből követhetünk az etikai megfontolások szükségére, amely a filozófia kérdésköre is.

Amennyiben lehetőségem nyílik témám előadására, annyiban ezen kapcsolódási pontok lényeges elemiről, valamint az itthoni gyakorlatáról és ezen témakör szükségessége mellett szeretnék érvelni.

Sun 18:30 Mária Ludassy (KEYNOTE SPEAKER): Korszerűtlen elmékedések

Ha a helyzet fokozódik és a hatalmi arrogancia elviselhetetlen bűze már a filozófusok finnyás orrát is eléri, többekben /többünkben?/ felmerül a másfél évszázada divatos frázis, Marx Feuerbach-téziseinek tanítása, a filozófusok világmagyarázata versus világmegváltoztatása témájában. Mivel magam teljesen tanácstalan vagyok – például pillanatnyilag megelégednék egy valamirevaló világmegértéssel is – inkább csak egy rövid történelmi áttekintésre vállalkoznék: mi lett a filozófus – és ami sokkal fontosabb: a filozófia sorsa – amennyiben a hatalom tanácsadója formájában felvállalta a világmegváltoztatási programban való részvételt.



